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MacDonnell 1 
SETTING THE STAGE 
 
Nostalgia is denial. Denial of the painful present. The name for this denial is Golden Age 
thinking – the erroneous notion that a different time period is better than the one one’s living 
in – it’s a flaw in the romantic imagination of those people who find it difficult to cope with 
the present. 
MIDNIGHT IN PARIS 
 
 
It is impossible to begin a discussion of William Faulkner’s 
examination of myth without tracing the complex network of ideology and 
narrative from which he emerged. After the Civil War, as David Blight 
outlines in Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory, a type of 
literature sprang up that “embraced the romance of the Lost Cause, the idyll 
of the Old South’s plantation world of orderly and happy race relations […] 
The age of machines, rapid urbanization, and labor unrest produced a huge 
audience for a literature of escape into a pre-Civil War, exotic South that, all 
but ‘lost,’ was now the object of enormous nostalgia” (211). The myth of the 
Lost Cause, Blight continues, was that of “a glorious, organic civilization 
destroyed by an avaricious ‘industrial society’ determined to wipe out its 
cultural foes” (257), an agrarian utopia positioned in the mythical past of the 
vanished antebellum South.  
In its original form, the myth constituted a reimagining of history. 
Groups such as the United Daughters of the Confederacy, whose influenced 
peaked in the early 1910s, participated actively in a process of mythmaking, 
through the “founding of monuments, efforts to control Southern textbooks, 
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lobbying of Congressmen, and their ubiquitous essay contests where 
Southern youth could exhibit the ‘truth’ of the Lost Cause,” forming a new 
brand of “‘history’ demanded by the Lost Cause” (Blight 292). As a general 
mood, but also as a carefully constructed myth, the Lost Cause took a deep 
hold on the consciousness of the South. Similarly, in William Faulkner: A 
Critical Study, Irving Howe argues for the antagonistic relationship between 
myth and history in the South: “The Southern myth, like any other, is less an 
attempt at historical description than a voicing of the collective imagination—
perhaps of the collective will” (28-9). It is an active “voicing” of an ideal past, a 
deliberate erasure of accepted history. It follows that this conception of myth 
is performing a sort of violence on history; the creation of myth is antagonistic 
to the idea of a universal, or ‘true,’ history. If history is the attempt at a linear, 
objective narrative, myth is its antithesis, a force that willfully works against 
the ordered progression of time. As Patricia Tobin writes in “The Time of 
Myth and History,” “Although myth refers to events alleged to have taken 
place in the past, its operational value is that the specific model which it 
describes is timeless. Time cannot affect [it]; it can only affect time” (255). 
Myth by its very nature operates counter to time; in its theoretical form, it 
participates actively in the erasure of time, operating utterly free of the 
constraints of historical narrative. 
Out of this wave of nostalgic rewriting came a reactive generation of 
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thoughtful and resistant writers. By the 1920s, the Lost Cause had “made itself 
a ready target; it forced a confrontation with the past that bred a Faulkner, a 
Warren, a Flannery O’Connor, and many others in white Southern letters” 
(Blight 293). This “confrontation with the past” took the form of ambivalence, 
toward the South, toward history, toward nostalgia, and toward the marching 
forward of time. By the 1930s, Depression-era nostalgia meant that  
an astonishing American appetite reemerged for the nostalgia and the 
Lost Cause of the Old South. Millions would flock to buy the story of 
Scarlett O’Hara’s struggle in Gone with the Wind (1935) to cope with 
the crushed but ennobled South in the aftermath of the war; not 
nearly as many would embrace so eagerly Thomas Sutpen’s fierce 
ambitions and the legacies his family coped with on the real and 
psychological landscapes of Mississippi in Absalom, Absalom! (Blight 
393) 
 
Part of the attraction of Gone With the Wind was that it omitted negative 
aspects of pre-war Southern society. Faulkner’s more ambivalent and nuanced 
portrayal of the South in Absalom, Absalom! and other works separated him 
from the Gone with the Wind sentimental vision, but as a child of the South 
himself, he could not quite escape the pervading power of the myth. Irving 
Howe argues against viewing Faulkner as “a traditional moralist drawing his 
creative strength from the Southern myth. The truth is that he writes in 
opposition to this myth as well as in acceptance of it, that he struggles with it 
even as he continues to acknowledge its power and charm” (26). Faulkner’s 
works do not simply demonize the morality of myth; instead, they explore the 
many facets of mythic creation and negotiation. This ambivalence is central to 
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Faulkner’s works, as Howe continues: 
[Faulkner] has set his pride in the past against his despair over the 
present, and from this counterpoint has come much of the tension in 
his work. He has investigated the myth itself; wondered about the 
relation between the Southern tradition he admires and that memory 
of Southern slavery to which he is compelled to return; tested not 
only the present by the past, but also the past by the myth, and finally 
the myth by that morality which has slowly emerged from this entire 
process of exploration. (Howe 29) 
 
Faulkner’s South is both the grand, nostalgic “Southern tradition” and the 
dark, deeply flawed “memory of Southern slavery,” the noble beauty of a 
mythical past and the harsh historical narrative undercutting it. The 
knowledge of slavery acts as a dissonant element in the smooth unreality of 
the myths shaping the “Southern tradition”; these myths work to erase the 
memory of past horrors. And beyond their direct applications, Faulkner’s 
works comment on the overall process of mythmaking, as it manifests in many 
aspects of human life. 
 Faulkner’s critical resistance to the erasure inherent in sentimental 
Lost Cause literature leads to his ironic and complicated representation of his 
heroes and their relationship to the myths that surround them. As Montserrat 
Ginés argues, “While showing understanding for those of his characters who 
have inherited the burden of the past, at the same time Faulkner regards with 
skepticism their retreat from the real world” (9). With an intimate 
understanding of the “immoderate worship of the past so deeply rooted in the 
Southern mind,” Faulkner writes compassionately, and with an “acute 
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awareness of his own delusions,” of the “propensity of human beings to 
mythmaking” (Ginés 122-23). In this way, Faulkner’s works respond 
specifically to the South’s Lost Cause mythologizing of its own history, 
concerning directly with his oft-quoted “own little postage stamp of native 
soil” (Faulkner, 1956 Paris Review interview), but in a way that reveals the 
universal need of human beings for myth. Howe argues that Faulkner’s 
characters “are of the South, signifying its decay and its shame, but the decay 
is universal” (47), as is the myth that creates it. As Isaac’s father says in “The 
Bear” (1942), the writer “had to talk about something. […] He was talking 
about truth” (Faulkner 514). The sense of myth presented by Faulkner is not 
one limited to the South, but is instead a productive “something” through 
which he can speak of human “truth.” Faulkner emerged into a culture that 
defined itself and its mythologies by its past. His works deal most directly with 
the mythologies and conflicts of the South, but his deeper meaning lies in the 
realm of the universal, and this study aims to follow suit. This study does not 
claim to explain the workings of the South or to seek out the specific flaws in 
its social structure or mythology. Instead, it proposes to use the particularity 
of myths, often but not always Southern, in Faulkner’s works to illustrate the 
structure of myth within narrative. 
Each of Faulkner’s works contains some exploration of myth. This 
thesis strives to complicate Ginés’ “propensity” toward myth-making, 
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examining myth as it is created and recreated through narrative. Each of the 
following chapters works to illustrate a different aspect of myth in Faulkner, 
in the process drawing upon resonances between the texts to trace the 
development of the mythic form. Chapter One works to complicate the 
concept of time, examining 1930’s “A Rose for Emily” in order to explore the 
conflict between history and myth in terms of narrative progression. Chapter 
Two looks more closely at the process of myth-making, taking 1936’s 
brilliantly fractured Absalom, Absalom! to analyze the creative process of myth 
creation, propagation, and destruction. Finally, Chapter Three focuses on 
1942’s “The Bear,” exploring the transformation of myth from seductive 
menace to valued container of deeply held truth, and observing the language 
of myth, the connection between myth and art, and ultimate value of mythic 
structures. 
 
 
MacDonnell 7 
 
 
RETHINKING CHRONOLOGY IN  
“A ROSE FOR EMILY” 
 
 
 
I can move these people around like God, not only in space but in time too. The fact that I 
have moved my characters around in time successfully, at least in my own estimation, proves 
to me my own theory that time is a fluid condition which has no existence except in the 
momentary avatars of individual people. There is no such thing as was—only is. 
 
WILLIAM FAULKNER  
Paris Review 
 
To Faulkner the escapement of wild time and place seemed one attribute of the thing he was 
writing about — the lost attribute, implicit in it... In letting time and place out of the box he 
was not, by any standards but our ordinary ones, being reckless. 
EUDORA WELTY 
 Faulkner Memorial Tribute 
 
Myth is much more important and true than history. History is just journalism and you know 
how reliable that is. 
JOSEPH CAMPBELL 
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I 
 
Near the end of William Faulkner’s 1930 short story “A Rose for Emily” 
is a brief description of time: after Emily’s death, the old men gather to tell 
stories, in the process “confusing time with its mathematical progression, as 
the old do, to whom all the past is not a diminishing road but, instead, a huge 
meadow which no winter ever quite touches, divided from them now by the 
narrow bottle-neck of the most recent decade of years” (60). It seems a simple 
moment, a short meditation on the effects of age and the passing of time, but 
it also serves to establish two oppositional senses of time, as both myth and 
history. The image of the meadow lends the past a mythical power, as a space 
beyond the destroying touch of “winter” and the confusion of the present; in 
opposition to this runs the “mathematical progression” of time. The effect of 
the term “mathematical” is to set up an opposition: it suggests a contrast 
between the rational, ordered, and objective, and the organic, subjective, and 
true. “A Rose for Emily” is thus a useful place to delve into the relationship 
between Faulkner’s characters and time, and ultimately his interpretation of 
time itself. In the story, Faulkner is inflating and deflating myth, empowering 
and undermining history, and ultimately offering narrative as a viable 
alternative in its subjectivity. From a narrative reworking of time, the story 
looks critically at the diametrically opposed models of myth and history, in the 
process demonstrating the deeply Southern struggle with the past. The 
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narrative tracks the contradictory human impulses for order and myth, 
nostalgia and truth, glory and horror. 
 The relationship between time and narrative structure quickly takes a 
central place in “A Rose for Emily.” Upon first reading, it seems that the 
temporal structure has been confusingly tampered with: there is no obvious 
rationale to the order of the narrative. It follows no clear sense of time, 
beginning and ending with its protagonist’s death and jumping disjointedly 
between non-consecutive events. On one level, it is ordered simply to deliver 
a surprise, to jar the reader, but on a more interesting level it is a deliberate 
rethinking of the significance of chronology. It is tempting to attempt a 
rearrangement of the story, as though it is an out of focus image, to be easily 
remedied. And indeed, readers and scholars alike have attempted this: Gene 
Moore expresses that it is “vitally important to establish [Emily’s] 
chronological place in the historical context of the passing generations,” and 
more specifically, exactly “what dates are carved on Miss Emily’s tombstone” 
(196). He recognizes “the importance of time to a proper understanding of the 
story” (195) yet persists in detailed chronological analysis:  
Homer Barron must have died when Miss Emily was about 33 or 
34 years old: at least 40 years before her own death (equal to the 
“at least ten years” since the last visit plus the 30 years since the 
smell) […] a limit is thereby set to the range of time included in 
“at least”: her last visit had to occur “at least ten years” and at 
most 12 years before her death, since if it occurred more than 12 
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years earlier, she would have been under 30 when her father 
died. (200) 
 
The analysis here is explicitly (and ironically, given the old men’s 
“mathematical progression”) mathematical (“equal to,” “plus,” “limit”), and as 
such it falls into the trap set by “A Rose for Emily,” the willingness to perceive 
chronology as set and natural, a permanent set of rules that the universe 
abides by. Other critics have fallen into the same trap, critics cited by Moore 
himself: “Faulkner destroys chronological time in his story” (Magalaner and 
Volpe, cited in Moore 195); the story “twists chronology almost beyond 
recognition” (Sullivan, cited in Moore 195); it is “abandonment of chronology” 
(A. M. Wright, cited in Moore 195). Moore’s concluding chronology of Emily’s 
life is not only beside the point; it is actually antithetical to the story’s 
relationship to time. Rearranging the story according to a strict framework of 
years cuts away its vitality and critical voice, ignoring the reciprocal influence 
of the past upon the present. 
The way out of this trap is the acknowledgment of a more fluid 
conception of time. If time is subjective, it cannot be twisted or abandoned, 
but simply presented as it is experienced or understood. It is not simply a 
cheap trick, arbitrarily creating suspense out of an inevitable narrative. Ray B. 
West, Jr. discusses the problem of chronology in “A Rose for Emily”: 
When, as in “A Rose for Emily,” the world depicted is a 
confusion between the past and the present, the atmosphere is 
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one of distortion—of unreality. This unreal world results from 
the suspension of a natural time order. Normality consists in a 
decorous progression of the human being from birth, through 
youth, to age and finally death. Preciosity in children is as 
monstrous as idiocy in the adult, because both are unnatural. 
Monstrosity, however, is a sentimental subject for fiction unless 
it is the result of human action—the result of a willful attempt to 
circumvent time. When such circumvention produces acts of 
violence, as in “A Rose for Emily,” the atmosphere becomes one 
of horror. (66) 
 
Distortions of time resonate throughout the story, affecting not simply the 
presentation of events but the characters themselves. Emily’s life has been 
one of stunted growth, time that simultaneously freezes and rushes on, a 
jumbled mixture of past and present that results ultimately in a type of 
monstrous “unreality.” The distorted progression of time is the source of 
Emily’s own distortion: what West terms the “willful attempt to circumvent 
time” could just as easily be termed mythmaking. The “horror” of the story’s 
finale is the discovery of how truly grotesque her inner world has become, a 
monstrosity that avoids becoming “sentimental” by implicating the destroyed 
in their own destruction. Jean-Paul Sartre takes the centrality of time further, 
arguing that even outside of Emily’s distortion, there cannot exist a “natural 
time order”: “if the technique Faulkner has adopted seems at first a negation 
of temporality, the reason is that we confuse temporality with chronology. It 
was man who invented dates and clocks” (88), and therefore there is nothing 
“natural” about linear chronology.  Here Sartre is setting up an opposition 
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between temporality, which is the position in past, present, and future, and a 
traditional sense of chronology as more directly connected to the limitations of 
“dates and clocks.” This is the chronology described by Moore and his 
compatriots, a chronology that assumes an objectively true order, the center of 
the historical model of time. It is also the “mathematical progression” from 
the story, proceeding regimentally onward with all the unquestioning 
confidence of a ten year old reciting times tables. Yet time cannot be viewed 
so simply: there is a tension here between the concrete realm of seconds, 
hours, and years (Sartre’s “chronology”), and the more abstract past, present, 
and future (“temporality”). Is the essence of time in “a finite extent or stretch 
of continued existence,” such as an hour, or is it the more broad “period 
during which a person or thing lives” (OED, “time, n., int., and conj.”)? I 
propose to reappropriate Sartre’s “chronology”: if it is defined as “the science 
of computing and adjusting time or periods of time, and of recording and 
arranging events in order of time” (OED, “chronology, n.”), then it can be 
broadened to encapsulate the historical, mythical, and narrative structures of 
time. Chronology is the method of arrangement: letting go of the assumed 
superiority of linear time, it can take a variety of forms.  
The chronologies in “A Rose for Emily,” then, take two primary forms: 
the first, history, an attempt at a linear, objective narrative, deeply dependent 
upon the ordered shape of mathematical time; the second, myth, a narrative 
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force that works willfully against any progression of time. The historical model 
is vulnerable in its ignorance of the past, while the mythical model fails in its 
refusal of the present; the two thus become equally flawed opposites. As Paul 
A. Harris argues, “the story depicts two mutually exclusive but coexisting 
orders. These cultural orders mutually define one another in the story 
through the contrasting modes of time that characterize each of them” (176). 
For the town, this is what Harris terms “serial development: modernization 
[that] follows a linear train of events that impose a grid-like order” (176), an 
inherently historical mode of time characterized by linear progression. In 
contrast, “Emily’s enigmatic features belie the linear march of time along 
which the town scrutinizes her” (Harris 176-7). Emily, as antagonist to history, 
takes on the role of mythmaker, resisting development, progress, and the 
change inherent in time by clinging to a frozen, nostalgic myth. Irving Howe 
ties the antagonistic relationship between myth and history directly to the 
South: “The Southern myth, like any other, is less an attempt at historical 
description than a voicing of the collective imagination—perhaps of the 
collective will” (28-9). Similarly, as Patricia Tobin argues, “although myth 
refers to events alleged to have taken place in the past, its operational value is 
that the specific model which it describes is timeless. Time cannot affect [it]; it 
can only affect time” (255): myth is the active erasure of time; in its theoretical 
form, it operates utterly free of the constraints of historical narrative. In “A 
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Rose for Emily,” Faulkner creates his own version of chronology, a view of 
time that, as Faulkner himself wrote, “has no existence except in the 
momentary avatars of individual people.” Faulkner is establishing a sense of 
time utterly independent of the linear progression of the clock or the 
calendar: the chronology of the individual narrative. He is, in a sense, offering 
narrative as a substitute. Truth, in “A Rose for Emily,” “is tucked away in the 
interstices of the narrative, in a ‘past’ that is less a historical past than a 
temporal zone opened up by the narrative” (Harris 172), and thus narrative 
succeeds where history and myth fail, drawing the two together into a 
subjective space that is able to encapsulate time.  
In this light, the pivotal passage about time in “A Rose for Emily” may 
be better understood. The narrator proclaims that the old are “confusing time 
with its mathematical progression” in viewing the past not linearly but as “a 
huge meadow which no winter ever quite touches, divided from them now by 
the narrow bottle-neck of the most recent decade of years” (60). John Irwin 
offers an interpretation of this meadow: 
The price which the generative moment exacts for its 
displacement into the past is a castration of the present through 
memory. In tropes such as the “golden age,” “the lost world,” 
“the good old days,” the past convicts the present of inadequacy 
through lack of priority, lack of originality, since to be a copy is 
to be a diminution, because the running on of time is a running 
down, because to come after is to be fated to repeat the life of 
another rather than to live one’s own. (109) 
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The “huge meadow” is an image of “the good old days,” an image of the past 
that undermines the power of the present. In this view of the past, all that 
comes after such a golden period has the taint of repetition; the future is not 
to be anticipated, and the present, the “most recent decade of years,” carries 
with it a sense of inadequacy. This is the view of time presented by Faulkner 
as that of the old and of Emily; it is likewise the view of time embodied by the 
Lost Cause. The problem posed by the phrase “confusing time with its 
mathematical progression” is much more difficult to resolve, and has resulted 
in various scholarly debates. Edwin Vartany encapsulates the debate over the 
word “confusing,” arguing that: 
The narrator tells us that it is the old who equate (confuse) time 
with its mathematical progression. […] Thus, unlike what West 
and so many others after him have assumed, the “mathematical 
progression” is associated with the traditional view, not with 
the new. In order to dissociate it from the traditional view, one 
would have to do some violence to the text and assume that 
confuse here means ‘mix up,’ ‘jumble.’ (190)  
 
Yet it is impossible to reconcile the image of the “huge meadow” with a 
(linear) “mathematical progression” (“A Rose for Emily,” 60). The trope of the 
untouchable meadow of the past is necessarily antithetical to an objective 
sense of time, as it is a mythical reordering of time, which is why, in the sense 
of time as narrative, Emily’s dancing and courtship days are indeed 
contemporaneous with those of the old men. The sense of objective time 
indicated by their “Confederate uniforms” (60) is insignificant next to the 
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narrative of their past, which places the glory days of youth above the realities 
of the present or the ambiguous period of the bottleneck. And this paralleling 
of their lives, with no regard to the exact years of life and death, continues to 
its logical conclusion. After her death, “Miss Emily had gone to join the 
representatives of those august names where they lay in the cedar-bemused 
cemetery among the ranked and anonymous graves of Union and Confederate 
soldiers who fell at the battle of Jefferson” (49), escaping finally into the 
meadow that no wintry touch of decay can reach.  
 
II 
 The multiple strands of time present in “A Rose for Emily” 
demonstrate a deep ambivalence on the part of Faulkner. As discussed in the 
introduction, Faulkner brings a critical eye to the illusions formed by Lost 
Cause literature, which informs his conception of the working of myth. In “A 
Rose for Emily,” myth interacts with history in the context of narrative in a 
manner that is critical and deflationary of both, and it is in this sense that 
Faulkner demonstrates ambivalence. Myth, in the story, is a seductive and 
appealing way of dealing with a disappointing present, yet also a 
fundamentally destructive approach to time. History constitutes a different 
type of erasure: the relentless drive forward subordinates the past. 
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Although Howe dismisses “A Rose for Emily” as a “generalized parable 
about the decay of human sensibility from false gentility to genteel 
perversions” (265), the story offers an interesting entrance to Faulkner’s 
earliest depictions of myth, history, and time. Notions of the supremacy of the 
past are represented in “A Rose for Emily” in multiple ways. Time exists on 
two planes in the story: the town embodies the historical model that places 
objective progression above all else, while Emily holds to a mythical view of 
time that attempts to undo progression and constitutes the worship of a 
vanished, and perhaps nonexistent, past. Both sides struggle to reconcile 
themselves and each other with time, and both ultimately fail. Emily’s struggle 
is to stop time, to hold herself in a past that represented no loss; in her retreat 
from time, she comes to embody the mythical view of chronology. The 
problem of the town lies with integrating Emily into modern ways of thinking, 
as in the universal human struggle of coming to terms with the inheritance of 
the past, as well as reconciling the visible signs of decay with her 
mythologized image. The failure in the story is thus one of reconciliation, as 
neither mode of time is able to incorporate the other. Within the story, Emily 
and her town remain at odds; true success comes only at a removed level, in 
the form of the overall narrative, which ultimately succeeds at bringing the 
two into conversation.  
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Emily and her town are continuously set up against each other. The 
town embodies a historical approach to time, moving ever forward in a linear 
progression that discards the past as it eternally seeks the future. For the 
townspeople, time moves only forward, a relentless replacing of the present. 
Phrasing such as “when the next generation, with its more modern ideas, 
became mayors and aldermen” (50) and “Then the newer generation became 
the backbone and the spirit of the town, and the painting pupils grew up and 
fell away and did not send their children to her” (59), suggests the wavelike 
forward movement of the generations, each overcoming and erasing its 
predecessor. Emily stands against this flow as a stubborn remnant of the past, 
a timeless, time-encompassing reminder of the fundamental inability to 
effectively move beyond the past. Her function, in abstract, is to deflate the 
power of the town’s attempt at linear, progressive time; likewise, the town 
functions to deflate Emily’s belief in a mythical past. Their opposition reflects 
the antithetical nature of myth and history: each attempts to erase the efforts 
of the other. In a telling example of antagonism, “The town had just let the 
contracts for paving the sidewalks, and in the summer after her father’s death 
they began the work” (54). The fact that work on “paving the sidewalks,” a 
clearly modernizing development, begins just after Emily’s father dies, a 
change that Emily refuses to accept, demonstrates the antagonistic 
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relationship. The town is literally paving over Emily’s refusal of change, 
attempting to bury its past as it has buried her father.  
Emily is explicitly defined in the terms of a burdensome inheritance for 
the town: “Alive, Miss Emily had been a tradition, a duty, and a care; a sort of 
hereditary obligation upon the town” (50). Her house, which comes to be an 
extension of her body, is an emblem of the past, “a big, squarish frame house 
[…] decorated with cupolas and spires […] in the heavily lightsome style of the 
seventies” (49), an imposing and timeless structure. The frozen house, “set on 
what had once been our most select street,” is gradually surrounded by 
“garages and cotton gins,” the immutable march of progress, which “had 
encroached and obliterated even the august names of that neighborhood,” 
leaving “only Miss Emily’s house” (49). Yet this seeming timelessness is an 
illusion; the signs of decay belie the house’s static nobility: it “had once been 
white,” but implicitly is no longer, and though it alone remains, it is “lifting its 
stubborn and coquettish decay above the cotton wagons and gasoline 
pumps—an eyesore among eyesores” (49). Emily herself is similarly described 
with the appearance of stability: “we had long thought of them as a tableau, 
Miss Emily a slender figure in white in the background, her father a spraddled 
silhouette in the foreground, […] the two of them framed by the back-flung 
front door” (53). Positioning Emily as a “tableau” allows no room for 
movement, growth, or humanity, no room for time to progress. She is 
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variously described as “motionless as […] an idol” (53), resembling “those 
angels in colored church windows—sort of tragic and serene” (54), and “like 
the carven torso of an idol in a niche, […] impervious, tranquil” (59). This 
frozen state culminates in the description of her as a “fallen monument” (49) 
after her death, as though acknowledging that she was dead in their eyes long 
before her actual death; even as she continued to breathe, she had already 
calcified into a mythical symbol of the past.  
Yet Emily’s mythic imperviousness is unstable as well. Just as the 
house appears frozen yet is still subject to the decaying effect of time, Emily’s 
reality is a grotesque demonstration of corrosion. The first physical 
description of Emily is far different from her image: 
a small, fat woman in black, with a thin gold chain descending 
to her waist and vanishing into her belt, leaning on an ebony 
cane with a tarnished gold head. Her skeleton was small and 
spare; perhaps that was why what would have been merely 
plumpness in another was obesity in her. She looked bloated, 
like a body long submerged in motion-less water, and of that 
pallid hue. (51) 
 
This is seemingly in direct opposition to the tableau image of Emily: she is fat 
instead of thin and wears black instead of white. But it is not a normal brand 
of aging; as Milinda Schwab argues, Emily “has not aged gracefully into an 
aristocratic matron […] The passage of time halts, of course, only in death, 
and thus Emily […] appears here as a kind of living corpse” (216-7). She has 
changed and expanded, time has had its effect on her, but it is as though her 
MacDonnell 21 
life force has been frozen in time while her body itself has continued of its 
own accord to expand. From the town’s point of view, informed by a historical 
mode of time’s progression, Miss Emily is an “eyesore among eyesores” (49), 
an inheritance inescapable, burdensome, and emblematic of the decay of the 
past. From the perspective of progress and the ideology that change brings 
improvement, Emily is an irreconcilable problem, as time, for her, is not 
improvement but decay. To return to Tobin’s argument, if Emily were truly 
mythical, she would be “timeless,” because “Time cannot affect [it]; it can only 
affect time” (255); instead, she is ultimately destroyed by, and powerless 
against, time. In this, Emily’s susceptibility to the destructive force of time, 
Faulkner deflates her mythical model, returning her to the realm of humanity 
in the refusal to accord her the true power of myth, and seeming to lend 
credence to the historical model of time. 
 
III 
Yet Faulkner’s ambivalence does not permit such a decisive 
presentation of time. Even among the increasing symbols of decay, Emily as a 
figure of the past possesses a disarming power and nobility. Although she is 
not ultimately the pinnacle of mythic power that she believes she is, the town 
is also not accorded complete supremacy. Irwin’s notions of the “castration of 
the present” (109) take form in the impotence of subsequent generations in 
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dealing with Emily. She responds to each of their attempts to control her with 
an obstinate imperviousness, serving as a site of resistance to the town’s sense 
of order and progress. She resists because she cannot move forward; they 
reject her because they cannot stand still. The struggle is between 
preservation and progress; what Emily tries to maintain is not simply her own 
status, but an entire social structure, one that has value for her but to the town 
is merely antiquated. Colonel Sartoris, who “fathered the edict that no Negro 
woman should appear on the streets without an apron” (50) is replaced by “the 
next generation, with its more modern ideas” (50). Immediately, they set about 
modernizing the town, attempting to eradicate Sartoris’ dispensation that 
“only a man of [his] generation and thought could have invented” (50). All 
professional efficiency, this generation of “mayors and aldermen” sends Emily 
a “tax notice,” followed by a “formal letter,” and finally “the mayor wrote her 
himself” (50). When Emily responds with only “a note on paper of an archaic 
shape, in a thin, flowing calligraphy in faded ink, to the effect that she no 
longer went out,” enclosing the tax notice “without comment” (50), the 
government, in a state of desperation, sends a “deputation” (50) to bring her 
into line.  
This meeting is a study in contrast. Emily’s mode of resistance is one 
for which the town is utterly unprepared. Entering through “the door through 
which no visitor had passed […in] eight or ten years,” the men see a “dim hall 
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from which a stairway mounted into still more shadow. It smelled of dust and 
disuse—a close, dank smell” (50). The only real motion in the house is “a faint 
dust [rising] sluggishly about their thighs, spinning with slow motes in the 
single sun-ray” (51). Imposingly, but idiosyncratically, “a crayon portrait of 
Miss Emily’s father” stands “on a tarnished gilt easel before the fireplace” (51), 
powerful in abstract yet weakened by its childish “crayon” and decaying 
“tarnish.” Throughout this section, there is the sense that the townspeople are 
entering a world utterly apart from their own. In the dark and shadow of 
Emily’s home, the efficiency and enthusiasm of youth is impotent. Emily, not 
the governing board or the remnant of fatherly control, is in power here. As 
though in deference to a visiting queen, the board “rose when she entered”; 
imposingly, “she did not ask them to sit,” but simply waits until “the 
spokesman came to a stumbling halt” (51). In a sort of performative utterance, 
in the J. L. Austin definition of the term1, when Emily says “I have no taxes in 
Jefferson” (51), she is not simply stating a fact but making it true in the telling, 
recreating a state of affairs in the context of the new generation. On the 
defensive, the board attempts to reestablish control, exclaiming that “We are 
the city authorities” and that “there is nothing on the books to show” the 
remittance of her taxes (51). To this, Emily responds that while “Perhaps he 
considers himself the sheriff” (51), she certainly does not, denying them 
                                                
1 See How to Do Things with Words, J. L. Austin. 
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authority, and utters the performative “I have no taxes in Jefferson” three 
more times. Ending the interview, Emily commands her servant to “show 
these gentlemen out” (52).  
A further incident that solidifies the threat that Emily poses to the town 
is her purchase of arsenic. Echoing the repetitive performative statements of 
the first scene, Emily enters with the statement “I want some poison” (56). 
Immediately afterwards, she repeats: “I want some poison” (56). When the 
druggist attempts to interject, with the town’s voice of authority, expertise, 
and control, Emily simply overrules him:  
“What kind? For rats and such? I’d recom—”   
“I want the best you have. I don’t care what kind.” 
The druggist named several. “They’ll kill anything […] But what 
you want is—” 
“Arsenic,” Miss Emily said. “Is that a good one?” 
“Is…arsenic? Yes, ma’am. But what you want—” 
“I want arsenic.” (56) 
 
The repetitions of Emily’s “I want” statements serve to undermine the 
druggist’s authority, literally interrupting his recommendations and 
supplanting them with her own. She cuts off each of his attempts to prescribe 
her desires (“I’d recom—”, “what you want is—”, “But what you want—”) with 
a steadfast knowledge of her own plan. The druggist, already conceding to her 
victory, echoes the desperate plea of the deputation, telling her “Why, of 
course. […] If that’s what you want. But the law requires you to tell what you 
are going to use it for” (56). Refusing his attempt to “look […] down on her,” 
MacDonnell 25 
she simply “stared at him, her head tilted back in order to look him eye for 
eye, until he looked away and went and got the arsenic” (56). When she 
returns home, the narrator imagines, she finds “written on the box, under the 
skull and bones: ‘for rats’” (56), the druggist’s final concession. Faulkner 
allows Emily nobility here: the flesh of her face is “strained across the temples 
and about the eyesockets as you imagine a lighthouse keeper’s face ought to 
look,” and she holds her head “erect, her face like a strained flag” (56), both 
suggestive of the strains of responsibility and fortitude, and the second a sort 
of play on the ‘unflagging’ nature of her spirit, as well as an ironic moment: it 
is the druggist, not Emily, who flies the white flag of surrender. And once 
again, the narrator notes, “she vanquished them, horse and foot, just as she 
had vanquished their fathers thirty years before” (52), suggesting an eternal 
struggle between Emily and the town, a battle that occurs once every 
generation, and which Emily has always won. 
 
IV 
Emily’s resistant power, however, is not absolute. Each of her actions 
functions as a desperate attempt to return to a vanished past, a vain striving 
for the impossibility of true myth. It is not quite, as Frank Littler argues, that 
“Time for Emily stands still” (82), but that Emily wishes it to. The static face 
that Emily presents to the town is the result of her attempts to halt time’s 
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progression; she does so because, as Milinda Schwab argues, “for her change 
will always involve loss. She must prevent time from passing if she is to hold 
on to what matters to her” (215). Her struggle takes the form of denial, denial 
that time has passed, that the town around her has changed, and that she 
herself has changed. This denial is a source of power for Emily: it undermines 
the town’s authority, which is based on the degree to which it has changed. As 
a figure trying desperately to hold onto the past, Emily correlates well with 
Minnie Cooper in Faulkner’s “Dry September” (1931), who, when young, “had 
a slender nervous body and a sort of hard vivacity which had enabled her for a 
time to ride upon the crest of the town’s social life” (“Dry September,” 67), 
but who was also “the last to realize that she was losing ground; that those 
among whom she had been a little brighter and louder flame than any other 
were beginning to learn the pleasure of snobbery—male—and retaliation—
female” (“Dry September,” 67).  
Minnie’s attempt to return to a position of envy takes the decidedly 
dark and deeply Southern form of accusing a black man of raping her; she 
sacrifices his life for a questionable return to respectability. Emily, similarly 
clinging to a questionable past, maintains the illusion of being impervious to 
time only by retreating utterly from the company of others. In this way, both 
Minnie and Emily function in much the way the proponents of the Lost Cause 
were: striving to hold onto a past that perhaps never was, trading existence in 
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the realm of is for an illusory was. Emily’s position as fading nobility seems 
tenuous as well: the narrator’s assertion that “people in our town […] believed 
that the Griersons held themselves a little too high for what they really were” 
(53) suggests a jealous desire to destroy superiority, but also introduces a hint 
of doubt about the family’s actual noble past. Nostalgia has a blurring effect 
on the past: but in the end, in Faulkner’s presentation, the falsity of Emily’s 
conception of the past is not the locus of failure; instead, it is her sacrifice of 
the present on the gilded altar of the past that brings defeat.  
Emily’s attempt to control time is symbolized by the watch she wears 
when she is first introduced: she has “a thin gold chain descending to her 
waist and vanishing into her belt,” which the visiting men later identify as an 
“invisible watch ticking at the end of the gold chain” (51). To her manner of 
thinking, she has time, as Schwab notes, literally in her pocket (216). Yet its 
loud, intrusive ticking from within her pocket demonstrates time’s unending 
ability to overpower attempts to control it. Just as Quentin’s destruction of the 
watch fails to eradicate the past in The Sound and the Fury, Emily’s chain fails 
to control the progression of time. Yet her desperate attempt is lent empathy 
by the violence of her father’s success at driving away suitors: “her father a 
spraddled silhouette in the foreground, his back to her and clutching a 
horsewhip” (53), “as if that quality of her father which had thwarted her 
woman’s life so many times had been too virulent and furious to die” (58). 
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After his death, she works to turn back the clock to her thwarted days of 
courtship. Just after her father’s death, the town’s ladies come to call; Miss 
Emily appears, “dressed as usual and with no trace of grief on her face. She 
told them that her father was not dead” (54). She stoically ignores this 
indication of change for three days, after which “she broke down” (54), 
allowing her father’s burial. But this instance of acquiescence is not final: her 
father remains an abiding presence, as on a “tarnished gilt easel before the 
fireplace stood a crayon portrait of Miss Emily’s father” (51), even outlasting 
Emily herself, as at her funeral there is the “crayon face of her father musing 
profoundly over the bier” (60). Clearly, the past is not quite as buried as the 
town believes. 
After her father’s death, Emily seems to have managed to turn the clock 
back to her courtship days. Emily next appears with her hair “cut short, 
making her look like a girl” (54), and begins courting the only man, 
presumably, who has not been driven away by her father: Homer Barron, a 
Northerner, with whom Emily begins “driving in the yellow-wheeled buggy 
and the matched team of bays” (55). But the town quickly begins to gossip, 
attempting in its ambivalent way to both tear down and build up her mythical 
status: “Of course a Grierson would not think seriously of a Northerner” and 
“even grief could not cause a real lady to forget noblesse oblige” (55), 
demonstrating a need to hold her up as nobility, even as “the whispering 
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began” (55). With shocked glee, the townspeople whisper: “‘Do you suppose 
it’s really so?’ […] ‘Of course it is. What else could…’” (55), suggesting Emily’s 
impropriety while also elliptically demonstrating an unwillingness to actually 
discuss it, foreshadowing the hesitation present at the story’s final unveiling.  
Aware of the gossiping, Emily takes an active role in her own narrative. 
In purchasing the “man’s toilet set in silver” and the “complete outfit of men’s 
clothing” (57), which leads the town to conclude that “She is married” (57), 
Emily attempts to reconcile herself with what might have been, returning to 
courtship as though she can actually rewrite the story of her life. As Schwab 
argues, her murder of Homer is the desperate attempt to hold on to a 
narrative that is slipping away from her, an “extreme example of her need to 
control change” and “the only way […] to arrest his activity and to suspend his 
vitality” (216). With “nothing left,” she, as the narrator perceptively states, is 
forced “to cling to that which had robbed her, as people will” (54), the past 
that is both her lifeblood and her death. The effort, of course, fails: her 
carefully constructed world betrays her in its decay. Her hair grows “grayer 
and grayer until it attained an even pepper-and-salt iron-gray” (58), her 
servant becomes “grayer and more stooped” (59), and her house, that “had 
once been white,” lifts “its stubborn and coquettish decay above the cotton 
wagons and the gasoline pumps” (49). Eventually, Emily dies in “the house 
filled with dust and shadows” (59), “gray head propped on a pillow yellow and 
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moldy with age” (60). And time comes to collect on its debt, in the form of the 
“long sleep that outlasts love, that conquers even the grimace of love, [that] 
had cuckolded him” (61), and not only him but Emily as well, in her attempt 
to control time as well as the narrative that makes up her myth. The passage of 
time, which betrays Emily into the humility and deflation that is death, serves 
to puncture the mythical image that she and the town have built up. When 
Emily, the town’s “tradition,” “duty,” and “hereditary obligation” (50), dies as 
a “fallen monument” (49), Faulkner has effectively deflated the myth of the 
South: the monuments of the United Daughters of the Confederacy, the 
essays perpetrating Southern myths, the collective sentimentalizing of a dark 
past have been proven false. At the heart of the myth of Emily, and indeed of 
the South, lies only a monstrous truth. 
Emily’s apparent success in resisting the impositions of time 
undermines the town’s obsession with progress and the future. Accordingly, 
the narrator and his community constantly seek to destroy Emily’s status and 
division from them, obsessively driven to pull away the mask of her myth, and 
yet when they finally succeed, the revelation of filth and humanity is as much 
on them as on her, and it is not a moment of victory but of utter defeat. When 
Emily’s house begins to smell, the town takes delight in “another link between 
the gross, teeming world and the high and mighty Griersons” (52). Her 
family’s claims to aristocracy are jealously regarded as having “held 
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themselves a little too high for what they really were” (53), and her failure to 
marry leaves the town “not pleased exactly, but vindicated” (54) in their belief 
of her fallen status. But these small victories do not seem to bring her down to 
their level, but instead raise her higher: “She carried her head high enough—
even when we believed that she was fallen. It was as if she demanded more 
than ever the recognition of her dignity as the last Grierson; as if it had 
wanted that touch of earthiness to reaffirm her imperviousness” (55-6). She is 
consciously the last Grierson, an immovable and irreconcilable marker of the 
past, enduring in both glory and horror. For the town, she is an obstinate 
signpost of the past, a letter in faded ink that resists all modern attempts at 
erasure. 
As Emily becomes more reticently mythical, her house becomes the 
only tangible proof of her existence in the town. After her father’s death, “her 
front door remained closed,” except for the lessons, which are mere gestures 
of respect towards an institution, as students are sent “with the same 
regularity and in the same spirit that they were sent to church on Sundays” 
(59). When even this empty gesture ends, “the front door closed upon the last 
[student] and remained closed for good” (59), and likewise Emily herself is 
never again seen by the town, passing as the house does “from generation to 
generation—dear, inescapable, impervious, tranquil” (59).  
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V 
The story’s final section is the key to meaning-making within the rest of 
the story: its ultimate discoveries illuminate and undermine the mythical 
elements of Emily’s life, as well as draw together past, present, and future. 
Emily only becomes vulnerable after her death, when her house, and the 
secret life she has carried on within it, becomes accessible to the town. Where 
the first section ends with Emily’s servant showing the Board of Aldermen 
out, the fifth and final section begins with the opposite: “The Negro met the 
first of the ladies at the front door and let them in” (60), after which he 
disappears forever out the back door. The home that has been her site of 
resistance and retreat from the world is invaded by the prying eyes of the 
town. Emily’s house is gradually overrun, first by the ladies, who come 
“hushed [and] sibilant” but with “quick, curious glances,” and then by the 
cousins and the entire town, who come to “look at Miss Emily beneath a mass 
of bought flowers” (60). Finally, the upper room is introduced: “Already we 
knew that there was one room in that region above stairs which no one had 
seen in forty years, and which would have to be forced” (60). The “already” 
implies an awareness on the part of the town of a grand, hidden secret; the 
“region […] no one had seen” which “would have to be forced” is suggestive of 
rape, in the metaphorical sense of the intrusion of the narrator, the town, the 
author, and the reader into the private sphere of Emily’s self. There is a 
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hesitation here, a simultaneous desire to satisfy curiosity and breach the inner 
sanctum of Emily’s life and an unwillingness to pull back the mask, a 
premonition of the horror that awaits. But this hesitation passes: once “Miss 
Emily was decently in the ground,” the room is reached through the “violence 
of breaking down the door” (60). Inside awaits the abrupt deflation of myth. 
The scene is taken in with the unwillingness of shock: first the “acrid pall as 
of the tomb” that is “furnished as for a bridal,” a marriage of love and death; 
then the dead man, the culmination of the symbols of decay, in the “long 
sleep that outlasts love, […] rotted […and] inextricable from the bed in which 
he lay”; and finally, and most importantly, the presence of Emily herself, in 
the “long strand of iron-gray hair” on the pillow next to him (60-1). The 
importance of the chronology of narrative emerges here, ending as it does in 
this climactic moment: there can be no interpretation or reaction on the part 
of the narrator that would adequately respond to the discovery; instead, the 
reader is asked to return to the story, to review Emily’s life in the context of 
this shattering information. This is a moment of epiphany and deflation: in an 
instant, the signs of decay throughout the story join with the images of 
mythical immortality, destroying the illusion, pondering the nature of 
appearance and myth, and implicating the town in the horror of distortion. 
The narrative ultimately emerges as a viable mode of chronology, 
offering a more subjective structure, formed not around the generalized rules 
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of either history or myth. Where history has to follow a straight line, moving 
unstoppably and eternally from past to present to future, and its antithesis, 
myth, has to present a static front, appearing and reappearing unchanged in 
all parts of time, narrative has the freedom to move, as Faulkner said, “not 
only in space but in time too,” as the subject requires. This can be seen in all 
parts of the story’s structure, overriding both the linear progression of the 
town and the static freezing of Emily. The story begins with the statement 
“When Miss Emily died” (49); on the next page it skips back: “Alive, Miss 
Emily had been a tradition” (50). Describing Emily’s defeat of the Board of 
Aldermen, the narrative establishes the pattern of challenge and defeat, 
skipping abruptly back to her defeat of “their fathers thirty years before about 
the smell” (52), which was “two years after her father’s death and a short time 
after her sweetheart […] had deserted her” (52). Despite these indications of 
linear time (“before,” “after,” “before”), the structure works intentionally to 
disrupt linearity, lending credence to Sartre’s dismissal of “chronology.” The 
story of the smell comes later in Emily’s life, as it is clearly the result of 
Homer Barron’s murder, yet it comes at this early stage in the story in order to 
demonstrate not the fact of the murder, which as of yet has no significance, 
but instead the nature of the relationship between Emily and her town.  
Further, the narrator discusses the way in which Emily “demanded 
more than ever the recognition of her dignity as the last Grierson; as if it had 
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wanted that touch of earthiness to reaffirm her imperviousness,” and 
immediately afterward transitions to the anecdote of Emily’s poison purchase: 
“Like when she bought the rat poison,” which also includes an indication of 
time: “That was over a year after they had begun to say ‘Poor Emily,’ and 
while the two female cousins were visiting her” (55-6).  These discursive shifts 
indicate a move in time but in a way that subordinates it to narrative: the 
objective order of events is less important than the portent they hold for 
Emily’s character and development. Milinda Schwab argues that this 
“rearrangement of the sequence of events reinforces the imagery of the watch 
that ticks repeatedly but does not move forward, for what is new to us, we 
soon learn, is not new to Emily” (217), and is likewise not new to the town. We 
therefore come to understand Emily in the context of a narrative arc that 
explicitly separates itself from the chronology of clocks or the anti-chronology 
of myth. Narrative is always a reordering, but it is often set up in a way that 
defers to linear time as the superior structure of reality. The work Faulkner 
does in “A Rose for Emily,” however, is to demonstrate how the deliberate 
shaping of a story is fundamentally distinct from both myth and history. 
Emily can neither be encapsulated by the town’s historical view of her 
gradual decay, nor by her mythical view of the eternal nature of herself and 
the past, as existing in, as the story says, “a huge meadow which no winter 
ever quite touches” (60). The town in “A Rose for Emily” represents a 
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structured sense of progress, one that moves unstoppably forward, while 
Emily herself is the embodiment of a mythical sense of time, one in which 
progression is halting and static, moving slowly and then leaping forward 
erratically. The power of narration, Faulkner’s alternative to both history and 
myth, lies in its ability to reconcile the two, to draw them together into an 
entirely different discourse, a subjective progression of time. The final section 
of the story is neither the victory of myth nor of history, but is instead a 
joining of both through narrative: it is the final moment in the narrative arc of 
Emily and the town, the climactic reconciliation and destruction of two modes 
of thought and time. Through the freed structure of narrative, Faulkner 
mediates the tension between myth and history, establishing a conception of 
chronology that centers on subjective, rather than objective, time. Emily is the 
obvious mythmaker in the story, and yet the town’s attempts to redefine her 
narrative bring it solidly into the realm of myth, for all its historical, 
progressive focus. Both Emily and the town ultimately fail to bring their 
modes of progression into fruition; what dominates instead is a sense of time 
centered on the individual yet simultaneously universal, incarnations of which 
appear in Faulkner’s later works. Faulkner’s time is simply movement, and 
thus can only be measured through the subjective progression of self, 
independent from calendars and ticking second hands. 
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NEGOTIATING MYTH IN ABSALOM, ABSALOM! 
 
Together on the stoop they hammered together a myth. Because it wasn’t born from fear of 
thunder, dreams, astonishment at how the crops kept dying after harvest and coming up 
again every spring, or anything else very permanent, only a temporary interest, a spur-of-
the-moment tumescence, it was a myth rickety and transient as the bandstands and the 
sausage-pepper booths of Mulberry Street. 
THOMAS PYNCHON  
V. 
 
One describes a tale best by telling the tale. You see? The way one describes a story, to oneself 
or to the world, is by telling the story. It is a balancing act and it is a dream. The more 
accurate the map, the more it resembles the territory. The most accurate map possible would 
be the territory, and thus would be perfectly accurate and perfectly useless. The tale is the 
map that is the territory. 
NEIL GAIMAN  
American Gods 
 
It was the last that remained of a past whose annihilation had not taken place because it was 
still in a process of annihilation, consuming itself from within, ending at every moment but 
never ending its ending. 
GABRIEL GARCÍA MÁRQUEZ  
One Hundred Years of Solitude 
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I 
Considering the prominent role of chronology in William Faulkner’s 
works as a whole, it is surprising how little has been written on the 
Chronology and Genealogy he appended to the end of Absalom, Absalom! 
Among those critics who have taken particular note of them, there is a 
division in the view of their literary value. Lyn Gartrell Levins argues that by 
including the listed information, “the author makes it evident that the Sutpen 
story did ‘happen,’ that the events of his life have behind them the firm 
foundation of fact” (35). As in “A Rose for Emily,” the temptation remains to 
reorganize and clarify the novel’s events; making such an attempt requires the 
belief that there is a ‘correct’ order that can be founded in ‘fact.’ In this light 
may be seen one of the more interesting editorial choices made on a 1986 
edition of Absalom, Absalom!, to correct the Chronology and Genealogy to 
align more fully with the dates and facts of the novel. This is in itself an act of 
interpretation: it requires, as Joseph Urgo argues, the belief that “the evidence 
suggests that these pieces should be treated as aids to the reader of a very 
complex novel” (198). Only interpreting Faulkner’s intention in appending 
these as utterly nonliterary would allow such a deliberate reworking of the 
novel’s material.  This kind of authorial hand-holding seems unlikely for 
Faulkner, who once responded to a complaint that his writing could not be 
understood even if read two or three times with the unsympathetic advice: 
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“Read it four times” (Art of Fiction No. 12).  
 There are more literary interpretations of the appended information, 
however, which open interesting spaces in the novel’s discussion. One such 
interpretation is that it constitutes another strand of the narrative, a final 
narrator. Urgo offers this suggestion:  
That is, in a novel full of contending narrative voices that create 
and discard ‘fact’ according to the needs of their narrative, do 
the Chronology and Genealogy provide yet another voice, a 
putatively factual one (because in a form, a list that at least 
presents itself as factual because it seems to have no crosses to 
bear, no interpretive agenda to advance) against which readers 
can and should measure the complications of the preceding 
pages? (197) 
 
Had it appeared at the novel’s beginning, the Chronology might have 
functioned more pointedly as a guide. Freed from the burden of 
interpretation and comfortable in the knowledge of how it will end, a reader 
would be left free to spectate. But the diligent reader will come to it only after 
weaving through an increasingly complex set of narratives, only after forming 
his or her own idea of the chronology. Coming upon the proffered chronology 
thus with one already shaped would seem to undermine the absolute 
authority. Having worked hard to form an idea of what is going on, this reader 
has become too much an author to concede full authority, even to the man 
whose name is on the cover. The novel’s pages are littered with failed authors, 
people whose narrative contributions ultimately fall flat. Why, then, should 
the reader assume that Faulkner has greater authority? The end materials call 
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into question the ability of an author to claim full authority, as Robert Dale 
Parker argues: “Thus on the one hand the appended materials seem to stake 
claim to some superior — because authorial — authority, yet on the other 
hand they wave a comically ironic banner of fallibility, of the author’s 
susceptibility to the same barriers of circumstance and medium that make all 
authority suspect in Absalom, Absalom!” (192).  In granting full authority to the 
information at the end, a reader will discover unaccountable errors and 
contradictions, which Parker argues demonstrate that the “part of the book 
that claims greater authority actually has less. [...] If this ostensibly more 
reliable part of the book is indeed less reliable, then maybe such an irony is a 
deliberate or even an accidental, coincidence, but for all that still telling part 
of the overall implication of the book” (193). There is much consider in a 
novel about novels that questions the authorial role, emphasizes its frequent 
failures, and undermines each of its own assertions. However, the uncertainty 
that is so emphatically present in the novel’s end material does not begin 
there; instead, it serves to illuminate and reinforce ideas already spanning not 
only Absalom, Absalom!, but also the broader body of Faulkner’s works. 
Faulkner’s works are often characterized by a deliberate working across 
time and space. It is difficult to look at a single piece of Faulkner’s work 
without taking into account the whole of it. His texts consciously ignore the 
constraints of chronology by continuously referring to and commenting upon 
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each other, operating not simply within the same fictional county, but also 
within the same mindset, the same timeless universe of fiction. Through this 
continual cross-commenting and reordering, Faulkner willfully discredits the 
chronological tyranny of time. For instance, when Wash Jones builds a coffin 
for Charles Bon in Absalom, Absalom!, the scene draws upon the relentless, 
unsentimental pragmatism of Cash, building his dying mother’s coffin outside 
her window in As I Lay Dying, chronologically later but published earlier. 
And, more significantly, Quentin’s suicide in 1929’s The Sound and the Fury 
casts a shadow over his entire existence in Absalom, Absalom! It is, in a literal 
sense, the struggle that precedes and explains his suicide, but in another 
sense it is the aftermath, the struggle to come to terms with a culture that has 
already been destroyed, a void that has already swallowed him. Many critics 
have noted the focus on failure in Faulkner’s works; applied to Absalom, 
Absalom!, this becomes a biting criticism of the South that unflinchingly 
illuminates its foundational failings, within a framework of inevitable collapse. 
The novel is predicated upon failure, big and small: Millie’s failure to bear a 
son, Sutpen’s failure to found a dynasty, the South’s failure to win the war. 
And beyond that, each of the narratives ends in failure, from Miss Rosa’s wild 
fantasies to Shreve’s Northerner incomprehension, and of course culminating 
in doomed Quentin. The failures here are pointed: the myth-making process 
can never be completed or resolved, but is instead a continuous and eternal, 
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and therefore no character can be permitted total success. If myth is 
something that works against time, as I claimed in the previous chapter, then 
it follows that the narrative disordering of chronology is a function of its 
reliance on myth. The mythic structures within the novel preclude the 
possibility of a straightforward progression of time; the disordering thus 
becomes a symptom of mythic focus and structure, as well as a piece of the 
failure that characterizes the novel as a whole. 
 
II 
Before looking more closely at Absalom, Absalom!, a more extensive 
analysis of myth is warranted. The framework of myth is a complex one. The 
word itself has no unified meaning: as William Marderness notes, popular 
culture defines it as a widely held conception that is inherently false, while an 
academic definition would be a socially constructed narrative used to explain 
origins and natural events, as well as enforce social rules, as in classical Greek 
or Roman tales or tribal origin myths (15). A final incarnation, Marderness 
continues, is living myth, the set of perspectives and values that delimit 
culture and “represent the mythic horizons that define reality for us” (15). All 
of these conceptions of myth are variations on the same theme: myth is the 
creation and substantiation of a cultural belief, founded not in the concrete 
realm of fact or figure, nor historically corroborated, but instead verified by 
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mass cultural acceptance and belief. These beliefs function to create a 
narrative of the past that justifies, corroborates, and controls the present. Part 
of the OED definition of “true” is “consistent with fact; agreeing with reality” 
(OED “True, adj.” 3a). What is false is simply inconsistent with fact, therefore, 
in that they are historically unfounded, and only subjectively “true.” Myth 
might, in fact, be termed “fictional”; a description made all the more 
appropriate by its connection to its narrative structure. The role of narrative 
within this framework is more directly noted by Paul Valéry, who broadly 
defines myth as “the term for everything which exists and subsists only on the 
basis of language” (199). 
Examining the role of myth within Faulkner’s works is by no means an 
untapped field. Simply perusing the titles of Faulkner criticism will yield a 
broad range of myth conception, from Caroline Garnier’s “Temple Drake’s 
Rape and the Myth of the Willing Victim” to Scott Chancellor’s “William 
Faulkner’s Hebrew Bible: Empire and the Myths of Origin.” Yet much of the 
critical work surrounding the use of myth in Absalom, Absalom! 
overemphasizes the roles of already formed mythologies. Observe, for 
instance, a statement in Joseph Reed’s criticism that concisely illustrates the 
limited manner in which many critics look at myth: “As myth [the novel] is 
certainly a version of the American Dream. Sutpen is too heroic and too 
American not to fall into the shapes and dimensions of that rutted category” 
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(146). Viewing myths as a “rutted category” undermines any true analysis of 
the form, focusing the attention on the particular ideology, instead of the 
larger structure. George O’Donnell’s essay “Faulkner’s Mythology” starts out 
promisingly: “his novels are, primarily, a series of related myths (or aspects of 
a single myth),” but then limits those myths to having all been “built around 
the conflict between traditionalism and the antitraditional modern world in 
which it is immersed” (49). Likewise, Lennart Bjork’s “Ancient Myths and the 
Moral Framework of Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom!” imposes a classical 
framework of Greek, Christian, and Hebrew myths, claiming that “Faulkner 
invites the reader to see nearly all the protagonists of the story in roles that are 
applicable to both the Greek and the Hebrew cultures,” calling upon ancient 
mythic archetypes in order to “enlarge the moral framework of the novel” 
(Bjork 197-8). The essay concludes sentimentally that “As a true tragic hero 
[Sutpen] evokes pity rather than hatred” (Bjork 203). Bjork thus implies that 
Faulkner’s works rely upon mythic structures as a shortcut, a readymade 
moral framework couched in recognizable ancient archetypes. Such an 
approach ignores the irony and criticism inherent within the work, as well at 
the creative process of mythmaking and its attendant authorial anxiety. 
 Jeanne Follansbee emphasizes the creative process of myth-making, 
introducing the concept of negotiation and bringing the criticism into the 
realm of social criticism. She argues:  
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by structuring the novel as a series of conversations that reveal 
Sutpen's enduring appeal as they transmit Sutpen's story to 
successive generations of white Southerners, Absalom depicts the 
constitutive role of storytelling in constructing a national myth. 
(Follansbee)  
 
Follansbee describes the novel’s narrative as a serialized dialogue, a set of 
discursive moments that reestablish Sutpen’s myths and allow them to survive 
for “successive generations.” Absalom’s fractured narrative structure makes 
evident the role of narrative in myth-making, in the process demonstrating the 
seductive social power of myth. Similarly, Reed’s essay ultimately dismisses 
the particulars of myths to focus on their complicated position within the 
narrative, thus offering a much more persuasive argument about Faulkner’s 
use of myth: 
Myth is less important here than failures to realize myth: the 
distance between the intention and the realization of myth, the 
distance between the organic myth which all the characters 
develop together and the private myth of each, the distance 
between the substance of myth and the process of making it. 
(146-7) 
 
Reed, unlike the other critics, notes the multiplicity of myths within the novel 
that makes attempting to prove the dominance of one an exercise in futility. 
He therefore subordinates these individual myths to the process of 
mythmaking, creating the possibility of a myth’s failure. Myths are successful, 
according to this model, when they become what he terms the “organic myth” 
(which in fact seems anything but organic, given the complicated process by 
which it defines itself). An individual can create “private myth,” but it has no 
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value until it is corroborated; just as history is verified by historical evidence, a 
narrated myth is verified when it is read, understood, and perpetuated by 
others. In this light, Absalom, Absalom! consists of a continual process of 
individual creation and group acceptance or rejection of myths. Whereas “A 
Rose for Emily” leaves its narrative more unified in order to focus on internal 
chronology, Absalom, Absalom! turns its full attention to the complicated 
process of narrative creation. 
This process of negotiation is evident early in the novel. Quentin 
ponders why Miss Rosa has called him over: “Its because she wants it told, he 
thought, so that people whom she will never see and whose names she will never hear 
and who have never heard her name nor seen her face will read it and know at last 
why God let us lose the War” (11). Such a statement might be taken to represent 
the drive of each of the novel’s narrators, and perhaps even of the novel as a 
whole. Miss Rosa wants Quentin to carry her view of the South’s failure in the 
Civil War, which focuses on the demon-vision of Sutpen, into the general 
mythology. The Civil War, that focal point of Southern history and 
lamentation, is the most definitive proof of the failure of the Southern 
structure; the stories in Absalom, Absalom! set out to explain to those who were 
not there to see it “why God let us lose the War.” Flipping the traditional 
origin narrative, these attempt to explain a culture’s destruction. They 
undermine a conception of objective truth, but also destroy the illusion of 
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unity and organic development in the grand Southern myth, the mirage of a 
glorious past of peaceful class, race, and gender relations, so that such 
deceptive nostalgia might not draw in another generation of backward-looking 
Southerners. And the power of this act extends beyond the South, beyond the 
Lost Cause, and beyond Sutpen: it is most resoundingly a stark examination 
of the process by which myths are made and destroyed. 
 
III 
At the center of the novel’s myths are the intertwined histories of 
Sutpen and the South.  Their stories run in parallel throughout, and the 
telling and retelling of the failure of Sutpen’s family serves to explain, 
interpret and describe the failure of the South. At the center of this is a 
passage that parallels the two histories: 
Because the time now approached (it was 1860, even Mr 
Coldfield probably admitted that war was unavoidable) when the 
destiny of Sutpen’s family which for twenty years now had been 
like a lake welling from quiet springs into a quiet valley and 
spreading, rising almost imperceptibly and in which the four 
members of it floated in sunny suspension, felt the first 
subterranean movement toward the outlet, the gorge which 
would be the land’s catastrophe too, and the four peaceful 
swimmers turning suddenly to face one another, not yet with 
alarm or distrust but just alert, feeling the dark set, none of them 
yet at that point where man looks about at his companions in 
disaster and thinks When will I stop trying to save them and save 
only myself? and not even aware that that point was approaching. 
(74) 
 
The parallel between Sutpen’s family and the South is here explicit: in 1860, 
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both war and familial disaster approach, inevitably and welling up from the 
cracks in the foundation of both structures. There is a clear connection to 
Sutpen’s original family, descending into the valley to live right next to a river, 
a quiet valley where disastrous destiny has been welling for twenty years — or, 
more likely, longer. The “gorge” which will destroy the family will also be “the 
land’s catastrophe,” rising and spreading from the “quiet springs” that exist 
deep in the valley’s foundation. Here is the necessary culmination of the 
novel’s various myths, each of which function to explain the inevitability of 
the South’s fall.  
 Not all critics agree on the value of aligning Sutpen with the South. 
Richard Poirier is notable among these: he argues that, although Faulkner 
“clearly recognizes the evil tendencies of the plantation system,” “Sutpen acts 
as a wholly ‘modern’ element” who simply “abstracts those evil tendencies 
from the controlling fiber of the community and its traditions” for his own 
ambitious purposes (18-9). According to Poirier, the cause of Sutpen’s excess 
and failure lies in his disconnect with the traditions and ideologies of the 
community that might have limited him. And yet this seems a rather 
sympathetic view of the Southern community that Faulkner is so often critical 
of. Sutpen is ‘modern’ only in the sense that he enters as an outsider: without 
the benefit of a familial fortune or illustrious ancestry, he is forced to use 
whatever tools he can. He seeks to enter Southern society fully formed, a 
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member of an ‘ancient’ planter aristocracy; his failure is bound up with the 
failure of the planter class as a whole, founded as it is on fundamental flaws. 
Poirier goes on to argue that a connection between “the character of Sutpen 
and that of the social system he exploits” (19) is “factitious,” reaffirming the 
interpretation of Sutpen as an ambitious and driven man who seeks only to 
“exploit” the system. This seems at odds with Sutpen’s desperate grasps at 
respectability and legacy, in his construction of Sutpen’s Hundred, marriage 
to Ellen, and attempts at sons. There are easier avenues to wealth, and it 
therefore seems clear enough that Sutpen’s design is a lasting and 
remembered place within the Southern aristocracy. 
Sutpen’s earliest connection to the South comes quite late in the novel. 
In Sutpen’s tale, told through General Compson, he begins in a sort of Eden, 
a land without wealth, racism, and inequality. He is blissfully unaware of the 
ideology that will come to make up the social structure of the South: “he 
didn’t even know there was a country all divided and fixed and neat with a 
people living on it all divided and fixed and neat because of what color their 
skins happened to be and what they happened to own” (221). The narrative 
aptly describes the beginnings of a myth: 
When he was a child he didn’t listen to the vague and cloudy 
tales of Tidewater splendor that penetrated even his mountains 
because then he could not understand what the people who told 
about it meant, and when he became a boy he didn’t listen to 
them because there was nothing in sight to compare and gauge 
MacDonnell 50 
the tales by and so give the words life and meaning, and no 
chance that he ever would understand what they meant because 
he was too busy doing the things that boys do; and when he got 
to be a youth and curiosity itself exhumed the tales which he did 
not know he had heard and speculated on, he was interested and 
would have liked to see the places once, but without envy or 
regret. (222) 
 
The myths of Tidewater begin as “vague and cloudy tales,” lacking reality, “life 
and meaning,” dead enough to permit being “exhumed” by sheer youthful 
interest. And yet they possess a strange, unsettling power. Sutpen does not 
even realize that “he had heard and speculated on” the stories, and yet they 
lodge themselves deep in his mind: he cannot understand or apply them 
without coming into contact with them, and yet they possess a kind of 
dormant power that enthralls and interests long before it comes to actually 
exist.  The passage concludes that “he had hardly heard of such a world until 
he fell into it” (222), and yet it is clearly that the workings of this world have 
already ingrained themselves into his mind. Sutpen is not creating a myth, but 
is instead slowly buying into it; a myth is merely a falsity without 
corroboration.  
 The family’s journey is thus appropriately described as a fall: it is a fall 
from the innocence of the rural highlands into the complex moral corruption 
and cooperation of the lowlands that likewise parallels Sutpen’s maturation.  
And now the whole passel of them from the father through the 
grown daughters down to one that couldn’t even walk yet, slid 
back down out of the mountains and skating in a kind of 
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accelerating and sloven and inert coherence like a useless 
collection of flotsam on a flooded river moving by some perverse 
automotivation such as inanimate objects sometimes show, 
backward against the very current of the stream. (223) 
 
 But there is also a perversity to this fall, a fall that is both “accelerating” and 
“inert,” that moves “down out of the mountains” but also “backward against 
the very current.” These contradictions allow for a complex view of the effect 
of this fall: the family is moving forward, moving into a space where Sutpen 
might have the opportunity to grow beyond the limitations of the high, 
impoverished mountains, and yet it is not entirely a step forward. Instead, 
there is a sense that it is a moral regression, a corruption of the innocent 
purity of Sutpen’s childhood. 
 The final stage of Sutpen’s acceptance of Southern ideology comes as 
the family enters society. Once again it is the environment, not its inhabitants, 
that acts,  
bringing into and then removing from their sober static country 
astonishment the strange faces and places, both faces and 
places—doggeries and taverns now become hamlets, hamlets 
now become villages, villages now towns and the country 
flattened out now with good roads and fields and niggers 
working in the fields while white men sat fine horses and 
watched them, and more fine horses and men in fine clothes. 
(225) 
 
And so, in the midst of the beautiful travel imagery, the structures of 
civilization begin to form. General Compson continues, “That’s the way he got 
it. He had learned the difference not only between white men and black ones, 
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but he was learning that there was a difference between white men and white 
men” (226) — a difference that will haunt and drive the remainder of his life. 
His design originates from the full assimilation of this distinction: he accepts 
the myth of laborless gentility to the point of wanting to embody it.  
Interestingly, this fall also unmoors Sutpen’s character from time, 
distancing him as well as the narrative from the simple structure of 
chronology. With no point of origin, Sutpen’s life can no longer proceed in a 
straightforward manner: “He was now weeks and months, maybe a year, since 
he became confused about his age and was never able to straighten it out 
again” (227). The phrase “straighten it out” is an idiom, but it also further 
emphasizes the looping, crooked structure of Sutpen’s narrated life and the 
novel as a whole. This stuttering confusion will recall Milinda Schwab’s 
description of “the watch that ticks repeatedly but does not move forward” 
(217). Along the same lines, it becomes unclear “whether it was that winter 
and then spring and then summer overtook and passed them on the road or 
whether they overtook and passed in slow succession the seasons as they 
descended or whether it was the descent itself that did it and they not 
progressing parallel in time but descending perpendicularly through 
temperature and climate” (224). The seasons seem to exist independently of 
the family’s progress, as though spring and summer were merely objects along 
the road, pushing past them or standing still, but moving in no discernible 
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pattern or pace. As in the whole of Absalom, Absalom!, the working of time 
becomes “confused,” and no one is ever “able to straighten it out again.” 
 The time in which the family travels, the narrative continues, is: 
an attenuation from a kind of furious inertness and patient 
immobility while they sat in the cart outside the doors of 
doggeries and taverns and waited for the father to drink himself 
insensible, to a sort of dreamy and destinationless locomotion 
[...] during which they did not seem to progress at all but just to 
hang suspended while the earth itself altered, flattened and 
broadened out of the mountain cove where they had all been 
born, mounting, rising about them like a tide. (224-5) 
 
Here again is that oddity: the state of immobility seems somehow more active, 
being both “furious” and “patient,” while the act of moving is “dreamy and 
destinationless,” a sort of inaction that is supplanted by the movement of the 
earth around them. They “did not seem to progress at all”; it is instead the 
“earth itself” that “altered, flattened and broadened,” and, reminiscent of the 
earlier lake imagery, “rising about them like a tide.” The true progress is not 
in time or topography, though, but instead in the gradual awareness of social 
structures.  
 This section of narrative offers a necessary lead-in to the crucial story of 
Sutpen’s origin, which is not of his birth or family but the moment at which 
he comes to understand the full workings of Southern society. It is an almost 
allegorical, impressionistic description of the discovery of corruption in the 
world, the moments at which Sutpen learns that those “vague and cloudy 
tales” (222) have substance and appeal. The myths become real for Sutpen in a 
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way that allows him to so fully take on his undying quest: he is the character 
who most fully swallows Southern mythology, and who most fully works to fit 
into it. Sutpen is an outsider, entering a society already developed, being first 
confused, then repudiated, and finally wooed by its rules, contracts, and 
implicit understandings. Sutpen, as General Compson says, “discovered his 
innocence” (226), by discovering the corruption of the Southern world. What 
Compson terms “innocence” is Sutpen’s separation from the society, his 
ignorance of its customs and distance from its complex codes of immorality. 
Using this terminology clearly refers to a religious sense of morality, subtly 
indicting the society Sutpen enters. Simply being able to understand the 
Southern hierarchy requires moral compromise and corruption. The tragedy, 
therefore, of Sutpen’s lifelong mission to insert himself into and triumph over 
that society, is that doing so corrupts him. Sutpen has swallowed Southern 
mythology whole; in doing so, he dooms himself to failure. 
Flaws in the process of myth-establishment can be seen in a series of 
narrative moments scattered through the novel. The period of Ellen’s 
flowering demonstrates an aspect of Faulkner’s social criticism of the South, 
but also serves both literally and thematically to bring Judith’s complexities to 
light. Just as Sutpen’s family comes to stand for the whole of the South, 
Ellen’s desperation can be a microcosm for Southern womanhood.2 This is 
                                                
2 See Lillian Smith’s discussion of “Sacred Womanhood” in Killers of the Dream. 
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the sphere into which Ellen gives herself; she becomes a grotesquely 
hyperbolic vision of this ideal. Ellen has removed herself from the world’s 
burdens, embracing her role completely as a wealthy planter’s wife. It is “as 
though she had succeeded at last in evacuating not only the puritan heritage 
but reality itself; [...] escaped at last into a world of pure illusion in which, safe 
from any harm, she moved, lived, from attitude to attitude against her 
background of chatelaine to the largest, wife to the wealthiest, mother of the 
most fortunate” (69). She has soaked up the idea of being a lady: when she 
shops, she is “gracious and assured and talking the most complete nonsense, 
speaking her bright set meaningless phrases out of the part which she had 
written for herself” (69). Out of the ashes of a failed reality, she rises “like the 
swamp-hatched butterfly, unimpeded by weight of stomach and all the heavy 
organs of suffering and experience, into a perennial bright vacuum of arrested 
sun” (69-70). Having lost all connection to the past and to reality, she has 
“escaped reality into a bland region people by dolls” (70). Passive and doll-
like, Ellen becomes dependent upon her status: she is “not contemptuous, not 
even patronizing exactly, but with a bland and even childlike imposition upon 
the sufferance or good manners or sheer helplessness of the men” (73), 
content to rely on the structures of chivalry.  
The illusion cannot last. Her false summer is always doomed to end: 
her sudden brilliance is “a forced blooming” (72), a scene upon which “the 
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stage manager [...] was already striking the set and dragging on the synthetic 
and spurious shadows and shapes of the next one” (73). Like Sutpen, it is her 
embrace of the role set out by myth that dooms her; she offers a tragic 
example of the futility characterizing Southern womanhood. Ellen’s glittering 
failures serve to illustrate the dangers of accepting flawed social myths, 
shifting from acceptance to perpetuation. Ellen works to pass on the narrative 
of Southern gentility, with uneven results: “It sounded like a fairy tale when 
Ellen told it later to your grandmother, only it was a fairy tale written for and 
acted by a fashionable ladies’ club. But to Miss Rosa it must have been 
authentic, not only plausible but justified” (76). To Quentin’s grandmother, as 
to Quentin, Ellen’s myth is simple delusion. But to Miss Rosa it is, for the 
moment, an “authentic,” if temporary, success of myth, a “fairy tale” brought 
to life through Ellen’s narrative efforts.  
  
IV 
If the preceding narrative moments have pointed to flaws and failures 
in both the Southern social structure and the mythmaking process, Charles 
Bon’s last letter to Judith brings these issues to a head, capturing the 
moments just after the Civil War, the South’s first shuddering breaths in the 
wake of defeat. The paper, he writes, is “salvaged (stolen if you will) from the 
gutted mansion of a ruined aristocrat; and written upon in the best of stove polish 
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manufactured not twelve months ago in a New England factory” (129). This letter 
therefore encapsulates the end of the Civil War: the ruin of the South and the 
broken victory of the North. The “gutted mansion” necessarily evokes the 
remains of Sutpen’s own plantation, and the plantation system of the old 
South; the stove polish, northern industry. Bon describes coming upon the 
“ten plump defenseless sutlers’ wagons” with “box after beautiful box after beautiful 
box stenciled each with that U. and that S. which for four years now has been to us 
the symbol of the spoils which belong to the vanquished” (130). This is an 
interesting concept, of war spoils belonging not to the vanquisher but to the 
“vanquished,” an odd moment in which failure is simultaneously success. This 
“box after beautiful box after beautiful box” becomes a stand-in for a piece of 
paper or a book, a container for myth and memory. Jehlen argues that the 
letter becomes proof of the historical reality behind Miss Rosa and General 
Compson’s tales; Bon’s “writing made the oral legend tangible” (72). But the 
letter acts as more than simply another piece of evidence: through it, Bon 
enters the narrative process, creating his own version of the legend. Inside 
these beautiful boxes, on these thin pages, lies stove polish, which becomes 
his ink, his narrative voice, and his final message to Judith. The tools of his 
narrative hold heavy literary and cultural significance. The act of writing is a 
form of containment; beautiful and lyrical certainly, but with a specified 
purpose of control. 
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All of this build up balances equally with the actual meat of Bon’s 
narrative, the second and final paragraph of his letter. In order to survive, he 
goes on,  
I must stop. Stop what? you will say. Why, thinking, remembering — 
remark that I do not say, hoping —; to become once more for a period 
without boundaries or location in time, mindless and irrational 
companion and inmate of a body which [...] is still immersed and 
obliviously bemused in recollections of old peace and contentment. 
(131) 
 
Like Sutpen, Bon, who until now has existed only as a creation of the other 
narrators, takes control and unmoors himself from time and memory, letting 
go of the past and its illusions, letting go of any “location in time” to become 
“mindless.” He is able to do this “Because what WAS is one thing, and now it is 
not because it is dead, it died in 1861, and therefore what IS — [...] I cannot say when 
to expect me. Because what IS is something else again because it was not even alive 
then” (131). The death of what WAS, the past, has somehow unmoored what 
IS, the present. The Civil War, for the South, has constituted an act of 
violence so extreme as to undermine all of the century’s built-up mythologies. 
To move forward, Bon must let go of what WAS, but as the past makes up 
most of the present, there is no IS without WAS. As Faulkner wrote, “time is 
a fluid condition which has no existence except in the momentary avatars of 
individual people. There is no such thing as was—only is.” Bon therefore 
touches on a struggle central to the human experience: letting go of the past is 
an impossible necessity. He concludes the letter by returning to his rhetorical 
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beginning: “within this sheet of paper you now hold the best of the old South which 
is dead, and the words you read were written upon it with the best (each box said, the 
very best) of the new North which has conquered and which therefore, whether it likes 
it or not, will have to survive” (131-2). The IS will have to survive, “whether it 
likes it or not,” trapped though it is in the stultifying eddies of past and 
present, myth and time. 
 As the novel progresses, Judith takes on an increasingly central role. 
She is a strong, willful character, the true inheritor of Sutpen’s indomitable 
will, trapped and overlooked by the limitations of her gender. She is 
perceptive, resigned, and realistic in much of the novel, but in the act of 
giving over the letter, her last link to Bon, Judith performs the desperate 
narrative action of so many of the novel’s other characters. There is a 
deceptive serenity to Judith’s narrative that belies a deep authorial anxiety: 
she begins “absolutely serene,” by telling her to “Read it if you like or dont 
read it if you like. Because you make so little impression, you see” (127). 
Echoing the nihilistic pessimism of the letter, Judith describes living as a 
desperate and purposeless struggle, “like trying to, having to, move your arms 
and legs with strings only the same strings are all in one another’s way” (127). 
There is the same sense of purposelessness throughout the narratives: where 
in Judith’s arrangement people are marionettes, moving “arms and legs with 
strings,” in Bon’s they are “homogeneous scarecrows” (129), in Ellen’s “dolls” 
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(70), and in Sutpen’s “a useless collection of flotsam” (223). And at the end of 
this mad struggle, she continues, “all you have left is a block of stone with 
scratches on it provided there was someone to remember to have the marble 
scratched and set up or had time to, [...] and after a while they dont even 
remember the name and what the scratches were trying to tell, and it doesn’t 
matter” (127). This “block of stone with scratches on it” cannot hold any real 
part of the past. Judith’s solution to this is a narrative one: “maybe if you go to 
someone [...] and give them something — a scrap of paper [...] at least it would 
be something just because it would have happened, be remembered even if 
only from passing from one hand to another” (127). The only real existence, 
for Judith, is in memory, a memory that can be passed from generation to 
generation through narratives; for Judith, it is meaningful “for the reason that 
it can die someday, while the block of stone cant be is because it never can 
become was because it cant ever die” (127-8). Judith defines is by the fact that 
it can become was; for her, the act of dying is a connection to the working of 
the human world. The human existence is, for her, defined by the fact that it 
can die, because something that can die must be alive. The idea of living 
memory thus takes on new significance: only memory that lives and mutates 
through successive generations can have true meaning. For Judith, myth is a 
deeply human, deeply necessary creation; only through the constant 
reinterpretation of the past can civilization move forward. Judith refines 
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Charles Bon’s philosophical views on IS and WAS, distilling his nihilistic 
argument that WAS is dead and therefore so is IS into the more forward-
thinking view that is must continually die and become was in order to make 
room for the new is. 
 It is this realization on the part of Judith that raises her to the stature of 
a heroine. Her short speech gives meaning to the failure that characterizes the 
narratives throughout the novel. The constant interpretive attempts are what 
keeps is alive, and each ends in a failure that simply makes room for another 
attempt. As civilizations rise and fall, leaving space for subsequent futures, so 
do myths. But Faulkner does not grant ultimate authority to Judith. Taken 
together, the narratives form an overarching mythic narrative, Reed’s “organic 
myth which all the characters develop together,” but that myth is shadowed by 
its status as a degenerating cycle, a seemingly endless repetition that does not 
move upward but is simply forced to go on, losing bits of itself at every turn. 
The structures repeat, generation after generation, doomed, like Bon’s new 
North, to survive even as they disintegrate. As in “A Rose for Emily,” 
generations wash forward continuously, but each successive wave not only 
erases but actually erodes the beach beneath it. The master myth is constantly 
being renegotiated and reformed, and yet with each recreation it falls apart 
just a bit more. Henry’s obsession with Judith and Bon repeats in Quentin’s 
with Shreve and Caddy; the true heroism is stopping the terrible cycle. 
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Absalom, Absalom! ends with Quentin because he is its only hope: it is a study 
in desperate repetition, downward spirals, disintegration, and he is the only 
one able to put an end to it, destroying the cycles of time, obsession, and myth 
through his suicide. 
V 
Judith’s narrative brings the idea of myth back to the appended 
Chronology. We need not make a large intuitive leap to view the Chronology 
as a series of grave markers, Judith’s “block of stone”. Its second half is a stark 
illustration of Sutpen’s failure, as it contains far more deaths than births:  
1862 Ellen Coldfield dies. 
1864 Goodhue Coldfield dies. 
1865 Henry kills Bon at gates. (380) 
 
These dry, cold, and possibly false facts are meaningless without the context 
and explanation of memory. Other people are the only true containers of 
memory and the past, as Judith argues, and the scratches on a page or a stone 
are equally meaningless without the corresponding mythology. Here enters 
the author’s burden, which lies in carrying the past into the present, and 
while each new narrative may seem a small eddy, circling backward, it is still a 
new act, a new motion that will carry on. The medium by which memory is 
passed is of course narrative; narrative thus creates meaning. Myth is an 
agreement to corroborate a single narrative, while history is the conjoining 
and distilling of many narratives. Quentin may be a failed narrator, a failed 
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historian and a failed mythmaker. But he does succeed at his most basic of 
tasks: he passes the narrative memory of the South, of Sutpen and race and 
class and womanhood, on to his readers, merging at the last with a true 
authorial role. 
And what of the Genealogy? There is a thread of ancestry running 
through the novel as a whole. Sutpen’s design clearly centers on originating a 
lasting line of descendants; similar to or perhaps because of his severance 
from chronology and origin, he is doomed to failure. Important to note is the 
interpretive act of organization within it: it is ordered not by date of birth or 
death, as one might expect for a traditionally linear chronological tree. 
Instead, it is ordered by a more subjective time, not of years but of 
relationship to Sutpen’s narrative. It begins with Sutpen himself, then moves 
to his first wife (Eulalia Bon) and son (Charles Bon), after which (reenacting 
the repudiation already discovered within the novel) it switches to Jefferson, 
beginning with Goodhue Coldfield and his daughter Ellen. Interestingly, Rosa 
appears before Henry and Judith, despite the fact that both were born, and 
thus existed in Sutpen’s world, before Rosa. The Genealogy progresses all the 
way downward, from the degenerate final Sutpen descendent, Jim Bond 
(“Whereabouts unknown”), to the story’s inheritor and young suicide, 
Quentin (“Died, Cambridge, Mass., 1910”), and finally to Shreve, the 
uncomprehending Canadian, who is the only character left alive and known. 
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Given its cross-generational scope and obsessive familial focus, in a novel like 
Absalom, Absalom!, the Genealogy essentially is the Chronology. The most 
significant difference between the two is their order: the Chronology is bound 
to the external framework of progression, the historical mode, whereas the 
Genealogy operates on the more complex framework of relationships and the 
subjective perception of time. The novel’s final pages thus return us to the 
conflict between myth and history. The novel ultimately leaves the creative 
burden on its readers: having read and interpreted the multiplicity of 
narratives in the novel, the reader comes finally upon an uninterpreted list of 
‘facts.’ Left only with the bare scratchings of the Genealogy and Chronology, 
Faulkner’s readers must determine which myths will survive to enter the 
broad mythology of future generations, and which will die in private infancy. 
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FINDING TRUTH IN “THE BEAR” 
 
 
Mythology is not a lie, mythology is poetry, it is metaphorical. It has been well said that 
mythology is the penultimate truth — penultimate because the ultimate cannot be put into 
words. It is beyond words… Mythology pitches the mind beyond that rim, to what can be 
known but not told. 
JOSEPH CAMPBELL  
The Power of Myth  
 
If you take myth and folklore, and these things that speak in symbols, they can be interpreted 
in so many ways that although the actual image is clear enough, the interpretation is 
infinitely blurred, a sort of enormous rainbow of every possible colour you could imagine. 
 
DIANA WYNN JONES 
 
Artistic symbols and myths speak out of the primordial, preconscious realm of the mind which 
is powerful and chaotic. Both symbol and myth are ways of bringing order and form into this 
chaos. 
ROLLO MAY  
My Quest for Beauty 
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I 
 
Faulkner’s 1942 story “The Bear” ends with Isaac’s father reading the 
poem “Ode on a Grecian Urn.” “Listen,” he commands, reading the five 
stanzas, “his voice quiet and deliberate” (77). “Listen,” he repeats, this time 
reading only the second stanza: “‘She cannot fade, though thou hast not thy 
bliss, for ever wilt thou love, and she be fair’” (77).  The poem’s presence is 
not inherently surprising; it appears in several of Faulkner’s other works, and 
the biographically-oriented will recall Faulkner’s much quoted line: “‘Ode on 
a Grecian Urn’ is worth any number of old ladies.” But the interpretive work it 
does within the structure of the story is more complicated than a simple 
authorial nostalgia. In the same Paris Review interview, Faulkner said that “the 
aim of every artist is to arrest motion, which is life, by artificial means and 
hold it fixed so that a hundred years later, when a stranger looks at it, it moves 
again since it is life.” The goal of art, therefore, is to create something timeless 
that will encapsulate all time, that will survive, timeless, noble, and true, into 
eternity; essentially, to create myth.  Blanche Gelfant argues that, to Faulkner, 
“timelessness implied the existence of a Platonic world where the pure and 
inviolate form of truth endured immune to the vagarious demands of ordinary 
life” (45). Working from this, Richard Adams argues that the ode’s 
contribution is “the contrast it contains between an aspect of speed or intense 
effort, representing motion, and an opposing aspect of impediment or 
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countering force that stops the motion or slows it so much that it seems to 
stop” (12). Encapsulated in this are the modes of progression: the rushing on 
of the historical and the stasis of the mythical. As in “A Rose for Emily,” 
narrative emerges to reconcile the two; the use of Keats in “The Bear” 
connects narrative to other art forms, implicitly defining art as a myth-making 
process.  
In another sense, the ode represents a version of the discovery at the end of 
“A Rose for Emily” or the Chronology and Genealogy at the end of Absalom, 
Absalom!: an interpretive key capable of illuminating, or at least altering, the story 
that precedes it. This is a structure that exists at various levels in Faulkner’s works: 
the reader is thrown headfirst into a confusing swirl of seemingly meaningless 
information and opinion; just when he has begun to believe that he has made sense 
of it, something new is thrown in, sending him eddying back, bewildered once more. 
Joseph Milichap describes the stages of the original poem: “the poetic persona first 
engages the ancient artwork with creative anxiety, then turns the urn’s visual images 
to his own literary purposes, and finally translates its silent if universal lessons for 
his audience” (100). “The Bear” is structured in much the same way: Isaac probingly 
engages with Old Ben as an author engages with his characters, which allows his 
image to take on a mythic, literary form. “Ode on a Grecian Urn” acts, finally, as a 
tool with which to guide interpretation of the preceding story. Faulkner’s use of 
ekphrasis thus layers meaning in a way that actually simplifies it: he uses his art form 
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(the short story) to describe another art form (the poem) which in turn describes yet 
another art form (the urn). By paralleling all of these works of art, Faulkner suggests 
a continuity of meaning that traces an artistic genealogy. It suggests that the same 
‘truth’ underlies the fictional urn and its literary existence, and the fictional bear and 
his literary shape.  
Like light refracted through shattered glass, the story of Old Ben exists 
in many forms: 1935’s “Lion,” 1942’s “The Bear,” and finally the novella-
length section of 1942’s Go Down, Moses. The version contained within Go 
Down, Moses has necessarily received the most critical attention, as the most 
fully developed and conclusive depiction of Isaac and the bear. Yet I propose 
to examine the version that appeared earlier the same year in the Saturday 
Evening Post.  Each of the three covers essentially the same story, but with a 
different focus: “Lion” presents a straight hunting narrative, deeply rooted in 
reality, and the Go Down, Moses version veers off into an extended social 
commentary on the South. It is in the middle version that Faulkner’s critical 
view of myth takes its fullest, purest shape, coming fully to demonstrate the 
depth made possibly by mythic rhetoric. The story traces the gradual shaping 
of a myth, through the interactions between Old Ben and Isaac. Coming 
between the other published versions, its brief events are weighted with the 
events of the others. In this version, he does not actually die, but the progress 
of his actual death in the preceding “Lion” and the succeeding Go Down, 
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Moses haunts the story much as Quentin’s suicide haunts his existence in 
Absalom, Absalom! Isaac’s view of the bear parallels the narrative’s view of 
myth; Old Ben is a mythic figure to Isaac but also a stand-in for a more 
universal concept of myth, and the story’s final acceptance of myth as a 
container of truth thus takes on broader significance.  
In contrast with Absalom’s focus on the creation of myth, “The Bear” 
explores the individual’s struggle with and reconciliation to myth. Joseph 
Campbell provides a useful definition of the purpose of mythology in three 
ways: to reconcile the conscious mind to the mysterious workings of the 
universe, to interpret those workings, and to do so in a manner that enforces a 
social order, molding the individual, perhaps through a violent break, to 
abandon his natural workings in favor of membership and unity with the 
larger cultural body (4). As the body is marked with membership, through a 
tattoo, scar, or circumcision, so is the mind imprinted with an accompanying 
mythology (4-5).  Myths, which emerge, survive, and self-propagate in the form 
of narrative, bring into being the social structures which create cultures. This 
view of myths focuses on the individual’s relationship to an already-formed 
collective myth. The narrative of “The Bear” traces a progression from critical 
mistrust to conditional acceptance of myth, following Isaac’s growth from 
innocent and accepting child to critical and rebellious youth, and finally 
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reaching a state of wisdom that comes from a deeper understanding of the 
value of myth.   
 
II 
Many critics have noted the prominence of myth in “The Bear.” As with 
Absalom, Absalom!, much of the critical work focuses on the application of an 
already-formed myth. Kenneth LaBudde’s essay on cultural primitivism 
describes how “among more primitive peoples the important stages of life are 
expressed in ritualistic customs which have certain marked characteristics,” 
and that “In ‘The Bear’ one finds much which resembles the[se] prevailing 
characteristics” (229), aligning the narrative of tribal “ritualistic customs” 
(myths) with the narrative of “The Bear.” John Lydenberg aligns the story with 
the structure of nature myth: “it is the mythical quality of the bear hunt 
proper that gives the story its haunting power. Beneath its other meanings and 
symbolisms lies the magical tale enacted by superhuman characters. Here 
religion and magic are combined in a ritual demonstration of the eternal 
struggle between Man and Nature” (282). And Raymond Nelson connects the 
story to the classical mythic form, arguing that Old Ben is “linked in his 
solitariness with one of the greatest myths of all time, the story of Priam and 
his destruction” (202).  
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A more interesting point made by Lydenberg is that “The Bear” 
demonstrates a type of “dual myth-making,” which he defines as man acting as 
both “creator and protagonist of myth” (281). The myth thus works on multiple 
levels: like many of Faulkner’s characters, the bear is both mythic and patterned 
as myth. These processes are intrinsically connected, as he is mythic within the 
story only because he is couched in the rhetoric of myth. The realistic style of 
1935’s “Lion” offers an interesting antithesis to the rising rhetoric of myth in 
“The Bear.” Comparing the parallel introductions of Old Ben makes eminently 
obvious the difference in form of a mythically oriented narrative. Old Ben does 
not appear until the fourth page of “Lion”: 
Old Ben was a bear and we were going to run him to-morrow as 
we did once every year, every time in camp. He was known 
through the country as well as Lion was. I don’t know why they 
called him Old Ben nor who named him except that it was a long 
time ago. He was known well for the shoats he had stolen and 
the corn cribs he had broken into and the dogs he had killed and 
the number of times he had been bayed and the lead which he 
carried (it was said that he had been shot at least two dozen 
times, with buckshot and even rifles). Old Ben had lost three 
toes from his nigh hind foot in a steel trap, and every man in the 
country knew his track, even discounting the size, and so he 
should have been called Two-Toe. That is, that’s what they had 
been calling two-toed bears in this country for a hundred years. 
Maybe it was because Old Ben was an extra bear — the head 
bear, Uncle Ike McCaslin called him — and everyone knew that 
he deserved a better name. (136) 
 
Whereas in “The Bear,” Old Ben is thus introduced: 
He had already inherited it then, without ever having seen it, the 
tremendous bear with one trap-ruined foot which, in an area 
almost a hundred miles deep, had earned for itself a name, a 
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definite designation like a living man. He had listened to it for 
years: the long legend of corncribs rifled, of shotes and grown 
pigs and even calves carried bodily into the woods and devoured, 
of traps and deadfalls overthrown and dogs mangled and slain, 
and shotgun and even rifle charges delivered at point-blank 
range and with no more effect than so many peas blown through 
a tube by a boy — a corridor of wreckage and destruction 
beginning back before he was born, through which sped, not fast 
but rather with the ruthless and irresistible deliberation of a 
locomotive, the shaggy tremendous shape. (30) 
 
The passages have many obvious similarities; their differences become 
significant in examining the rhetoric that creates myth. The overall impact of 
the bear’s transformation is the creation of a myth outside the traditional 
hunting narrative. Through the weighted rhetoric of myth, Old Ben becomes 
more than simply a “head bear,” taking on the added import of a god-like, 
almost allegorical stature. When “He was known well for” becomes “the long 
legend,” the narrative makes more explicit its process of myth-making. When 
“Old Ben had lost three toes from his nigh hind foot in a steel trap” becomes 
“with one trap-ruined foot,” the bear turns from a human-injured animal to a 
more mysterious figure, seeming to have sprung forth fully (de)formed. And 
when the parenthetical “it was said that he had been shot at least two dozen 
times” transforms into the heroic “shotgun and even rifle charges delivered at 
point-blank range and with no more effect than so many peas blown through 
a tube by a boy,” the bear demonstrates not just a thick skin but a sort of 
lyrical immortality. The diction of the first is flat and straightforward in 
comparison with the second, less lyrical and mythical. Between the two can be 
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seen the effect a mythical form has on essentially the same story: the myth-
infused diction in “The Bear” is willfully pedestrian in “Lion.” Likewise, there 
is a sense of inheritance and genealogy in the “Lion” passage (“it was a long 
time ago,” “a hundred years”), but that notion takes true form in “The Bear,” 
where the “inherited” Old Ben is comes through “a corridor of wreckage and 
destruction beginning back before he was born,” a much more timeless figure. 
This rhetoric transforms the hunting narrative into a higher form of art, a 
form closer to Keats’ “Ode on a Grecian Urn,” and simultaneously makes Old 
Ben into a mythical figure, aligned with the fictional urn. The importance of 
this change in rhetorical structure, therefore, lies in the universalizing shape 
of art: the myths of masculinity in “Lion” become less particular and therefore 
more significant in “The Bear.” 
 
III 
“The Bear” seems at first glance to follow a straightforward chronology. 
It begins temporally positioned and constrained: “He was ten” (30). There is 
no fractured time, no whiplashing switchbacks or rearranged life events. This 
is because it follows only one character, tracing the experience of one boy, 
without the complicating factor of outside narrators or overlapping narratives. 
Imposed, mechanical time is replaced entirely by subjectivity: time in the story 
is measured by the year’s of Isaac’s existence, a victory of the subjective time 
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that “A Rose for Emily” works towards. His ages continue to anchor the story 
to a qualified outer reality. Each of his three encounters with Old Ben is 
directly tied to an age. At the time of the second encounter, “It was in June of 
the next year. He was eleven” (74). After seeing Old Ben, he thinks, “It will be 
next fall. But it was not next fall, nor the next nor the next. He was fourteen 
then” (76). Age is paradoxically a subjective constant, a clock begun at the 
moment of birth that ticks through the years the same way for each person, 
and yet does not tick in unison with any other. Isaac’s tenth year aligns with 
the tenth year of all those around him, and yet occurs separately from theirs. 
Each individual’s clock may tick in the same way, but there is no larger 
framework unifying them, no Greenwich Mean Time imposing itself 
mechanically, no objective measurement of reality. In addition, Old Ben, 
whose name recalls England’s Big Ben clock tower, is described as “an 
anachronism, indomitable and invincible, out of an old dead time” (30). He is 
a symbol of time, but a time (a was) that perversely persists outside of the past, 
running “indomitable” and “absolved of mortality” (150) from past to present 
and presumably to future.  
At the story’s beginning, everything that Isaac, and therefore the 
narrative, knows of the bear is his myth, which pervades the manly hunter’s 
world into which Isaac has been born. The first line of the bear’s entrance 
into the story offers yet another example of Faulkner’s looping structures: “He 
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had already inherited it then, without ever having seen it, the tremendous 
bear” (30). The sentence tantalizingly dangles an inscrutable “it,” refusing its 
reader a definition until the third clause. Finally, Faulkner gives form to 
shadow, defining it as “the tremendous bear” and forcing his reader to return, 
better informed, to the sentence’s beginning. The shadowy obfuscation on 
this minute level repeats in the larger story, as the bear begins as a shadow 
and gradually grows into something more definable, more capable of being 
seen. Something that can be seen has a physical reality, an objective, rather 
than mythic, form; what is seen need not be inherited, it simply is. The bear 
exists for Isaac outside of the realm of reality: 
It ran in his knowledge before he ever saw it. [...] It looked and 
towered in his dreams before he even saw the unaxed woods 
where it left its crooked print. [...] He seemed to see it entire with 
a child’s complete divination before he ever laid eyes on either. 
(30) 
 
In Isaac’s childhood, the bear is couched entirely in the rhetoric of myth, 
presented as a being of no tangible substance that cannot be seen but simply 
imagined, dreamed, felt. Yet it somehow exists within Isaac’s “knowledge”; he 
knows it long before he lays eyes on it. Like Sutpen, he knows of the myth 
long before he knows of the tangible reality underlying it. The hesitation 
contained in “seemed to see” suggests that he sees the bear through a sort of 
mythic imagination, with “divination” as an oracle might ‘see’ the future.  
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Isaac’s first encounter with the bear is defined in equally sensory terms. 
In the wake of the bear’s passing, the dogs’ barking is: 
a moiling yapping an octave too high, with something more than 
indecision and even abjectness to it, not even moving very fast, 
taking a long time to pass completely out of hearing, leaving even 
then somewhere in the air that echo, thin, slightly hysterical, 
abject, almost grieving, with no sense of a fleeing, unseen, 
smoke-colored, grass-eating shape ahead of it. (31) 
 
The passing of the bear is marked by rippling and complex emotion, not the 
simple masculinity of a chase but instead marked by “indecision” and 
“abjectness,” and echoing a “thin, slightly hysterical, abject, almost grieving” 
lament. The bear’s presence touches the narrative only through the sensory 
image of the dogs, as though, like a myth, it lives only in the mouths and 
minds of living beings. The barking dogs thus become narrators, their voices 
performatively bringing into being an ephemeral idea. The bear enters the 
story as an intangible yet noble being of a much greater stature than the deer, 
a “fleeing,” “grass-eating” presence. This is Isaac’s first encounter with the 
bear; it is defined by the presence of the dogs, who act throughout the story as 
complementary authorial voices. When Sam and Isaac return to the camp, 
they find the dogs shrouded in the “effluvium of something more than dog, 
stronger than dog and not just animal, just beast, because still there had been 
nothing in front of that abject and almost painful yapping save the solitude, 
the wilderness” (31). The magical qualities of this myth, for Isaac, cling to 
those who come into contact with its source. Even when the final dog returns 
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with “tattered ear” and “raked shoulder,” Isaac sees not the effect of a real 
bear’s claws but instead “the wilderness which, leaning for the moment down, 
had patted lightly once the hound’s temerity” (31). To this point, “to the boy it 
was still no living creature” (31); it continues to exist solely in the form of 
intangible myth.  
 Soon after comes a significant shift. Looking down at the “print of the 
enormous warped two-toed foot,” Isaac has an epiphany:  
He realized for the first time that the bear which had run in his 
listening and loomed in his dreams since before he could 
remember to the contrary, and which, therefore, must have 
existed in the listening and dreams of his father and Major de 
Spain and even old General Compson, too, before they began to 
remember in their turn, was a mortal animal, and that if they had 
departed for the camp each November without any actual hope 
of bringing its trophy back, it was not because it could not be 
slain, but because so far they had had no actual hope to. (31) 
 
There is here an acknowledgment of the genealogy of myth, the way in which 
it is passed generationally down. Like the ticking clock of age, the dreams in 
which the bear becomes myth have occurred over and over, simultaneously in 
the subjective sense of time, yet separated temporally between the generations 
of Isaac, his father, and “old General Compson,” and endlessly backward from 
there. Discovering the reality behind the myth appears to be a natural 
occurrence, a part of the process of growing up. But there is a curious 
structure to this process of losing innocence. In the act of giving in to the 
myth, each of the men has forgotten what he previously knew. The act of 
MacDonnell 78 
discovery is actually an act of remembering, of rediscovering what they had 
once known, the fact that the bear “was a mortal animal.” Yet they continue to 
return to the camp even after this memory of mortality returns, coming home 
without killing the bear in an attempt at denial, “not because it could not be 
slain, but because so far they had had no actual hope to” (31). Within this 
rhetoric of repetition, there is foreshadowing that the cycle will come to an 
end. There is a circularity to the genealogical nature of myth: a child puts 
away the myths of Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny, yet resurrects them for 
her own children, because despite their literal falsity, there is a type of truth 
and beauty underlying them. The child must recognize what she already 
knows, that myth has an objective falsity, yet cannot ignore the inherent, 
subjective value within. The myths in “The Bear,” however, are set within a 
degenerating cycle, and so, while “so far” the men have not desired to actually 
kill the bear, implicit in the phrase is the understanding that a time 
approaches when one of them will want to, or need to, kill the bear. 
 The difference between knowing and remembering has resonances in 
many of Faulkner’s works. In “Some Notes on Time in Fiction,” Eudora Welty 
argues that Faulkner destroys chronology with in order to “make way for 
memory and the life of the past” (59). The act of remembering, she continues,  
is so basic and vital a part of staying alive that it takes on the 
strength of an instinct of survival, and acquires the power of an 
art. Remembering is done through the blood, it is a 
bequeathment, it takes account of what happens before a man is 
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born as if he were there taking part. It is a physical absorption 
through the living body, it is a spiritual heritage. (Welty 59)  
 
This argument goes a long way toward explaining the complex structure of 
remembering something one has never before known: the individual absorbs 
these memories through the long line of genealogy, taking in as a 
“bequeathment” the accumulated knowledge of those events which have 
occurred before his birth. John Irwin’s study of doubling and repetition takes 
this concept into the realm of time: what exists in Faulkner’s work is an 
“awareness that the memory of what has occurred in the past is at the same 
time the foreknowledge of what will be repeated in the future, the debilitating 
sense that time is a circular street and that recollection is prophecy” (70). Isaac 
“remembers” the actions and dreams of his predecessors only when he comes 
of age; the loop of knowledge is his inheritance. But his inheritance is also his 
doom, as it controls and limits him. Isaac, like Quentin, cannot accept this 
inheritance, cannot withstand the trap that is circular time, once again 
returning to that “watch that ticks repeatedly but does not move forward” 
(Schwab 217).  
 Escaping this circular doom becomes Isaac’s primary motivation. Isaac 
and Old Ben are increasingly twinned as the story progresses, and Isaac 
paradoxically becomes both destroyer and savior of the bear and the world in 
which he exists. As the story continues, Isaac takes on this role more and 
more forcefully: 
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So I must see him, he thought. I must look at him. Otherwise, it 
seemed to him that it would go on like this forever, as it had 
gone on with his father and Major de Spain, who was older than 
his father, and even with old General Compson, who had been 
old enough to be a brigade commander in 1865. Otherwise, it 
would go on so forever, next time and next time, after and after 
and after. It seemed to him that he could see the two of them, 
himself and the bear, shadowy in the limbo from which time 
emerged, becoming time; the old bear absolved of morality and 
himself partaking, sharing a little of it, enough of it. (74) 
 
The idea that “it would go on like this forever” is appalling to Isaac. The myth 
growing out of and around the bear, which for Isaac begins with the Civil 
War, represented by General Compson, “a brigade commander in 1865,” will 
continue to expand and infect “forever, next time and next time, after and 
after and after” (74), eternally. As long as the myth survives, Isaac and his 
descendants are doomed by it. The only way to stop this degenerating cycle is 
to “look at him” and see him for what he really is, not what they have dreamed 
him to be. If he fails to stop it, Isaac believes “he could see the two of them, 
himself and the bear, shadowy in the limbo from which time emerged, 
becoming time; the old bear absolved of morality and himself partaking, 
sharing a little of it, enough of it” (74). Once again, the idea of seeing enters 
the picture: the act of seeing here appears as a performative working of 
imagination; his dreams threaten to bring these mythical shapes into an 
eternal reality. “So I will have to see him,” concludes Isaac, “without dread or 
even hope. I will have to look at him” (74). It is not hatred or bloodthirst; he is 
neither eager nor unwilling, but simply imbued with a deep sense of duty. He 
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must end the cycle, for himself, for his descendants, and even for the bear. 
Isaac, like Quentin, feels this burden more than his ancestors because he is 
the most receptive to the authorial duty. He is the artist of his family, imbued 
with the perception and understanding necessary to truly see the mythic cycle. 
 Here the relative structure of time emerges once again. “He was 
eleven,” and all have returned to camp to celebrate, with that notion of 
simultaneity, the birthdays of both General Compson and Major de Spain, 
“although the one had been born in September and the other in the depth of 
winter and in another decade” (74). He begins his first lone forays into the 
woods, “teaching himself to be a better-than-fair woodsman without even 
knowing he was doing it” (74), repeating that sense of ennui and knowledge 
that hovers on the edge of acknowledgement and oblivion. He comes upon 
the footprint that effected such a serious shift; time seems to have passed with 
an odd rapidity: “It was almost completely crumbled now, healing with 
unbelievable speed, a passionate and almost visible relinquishment, back into 
the earth from which the tree had grown” (74). It is once again a mystical 
moment, as though the wilderness has put forth a sign of mortality specifically 
for Isaac, and withdrawn it hastily and nearly completely. But he cannot find 
the bear, not, according to Sam, as long as he carries his gun to fend off the 
terror of the wilderness. “You will have to choose” (74), Sam tells him, and he 
does, leaving his gun behind “of his own will and relinquishment,” as “a 
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condition in which not only the bear’s heretofore inviolable anonymity but all 
the old rules and balances of hunter and hunted had been abrogated” (74). 
The climactic moment of encounter approaches; that “heretofore inviolable 
anonymity” is soon to be “abrogated” along with the traditionally defined roles 
of “hunter and hunted.”  
 
IV 
 There is one final battle with the objective sense of time. Isaac is 
“traveling now not only by the compass but by the old, heavy, biscuit-thick 
silver watch which had belonged to his grandfather” (74), clinging to the 
watch as he had to the gun. The watch is weighted by the past, possessing a 
sense of ancestry in that it had “belonged to his grandfather.”  He is aware 
that outside time has passed, in the quick math of: “He had left the camp nine 
hours ago; nine hours from now, dark would have already been an hour old” 
(74). But he ignores the importance of these hours and the tyranny of the 
passage of time, realizing instead that: “It was the watch, the compass, the 
stick — the three lifeless mechanicals with which for nine hours he had 
fended the wilderness off; he hung the watch and compass carefully on a bush 
and leaned the stick beside them and relinquished completely to it” (74). Isaac 
leaves the watch behind, along with compass and stick, in a deeply symbolic 
moment that accomplishes what Emily, chained to her watch, could not in “A 
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Rose for Emily,” and what Quentin in The Sound and the Fury can accomplish 
only through suicide. It is also a symbol of mechanical, absolute time that 
occurs outside and imposes on the individual; leaving it behind, Isaac frees 
himself to proceed at the pace of his internal, subjective sense of time. Having 
left behind from these defensive elements, Isaac is open at last to embrace and 
destroy the bear, myth and all. 
 Without his aids, the wilderness becomes a maze. He enters a mythic, 
confusing land in which everything appears to be shifting, intangible: “he was 
trying to keep a bearing on the tree [...] but the tree was not there, [...] finding 
the tree at last, but in the wrong place — no bush, no compass, no watch — 
and the tree not even the tree” (76). As in Absalom, Absalom!, the story’s hero 
becomes unmoored from objective reality, having left behind the watch and 
compass that had served as anchors. There, as though by design, appears first 
another crooked footprint, and then the bear itself:  
As he looked up, the wilderness coalesced, solidified — the 
glade, the tree he sought, the bush, the watch and the compass 
glinting where a ray of sunlight touched them. Then he saw the 
bear. It did not emerge, appear; it was just there, immobile, 
solid, fixed in the hot dappling of the green and windless noon, 
not as big as he had dreamed it, but as big as he had expected it, 
bigger, dimensionless against the dappled obscurity, looking at 
him where he sat quietly on the log and looked back at it. (76) 
 
Having found the footprint, that prior source of epiphany, Isaac is suddenly 
given back his tree, watch, and compass. Finally, he “saw the bear,” appearing 
still, “immobile, solid, fixed” before him. It is “not as big as he had dreamed 
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it,” no longer filling its original mythic grandeur, but is instead “as big as he 
had expected it,” which is in fact both “bigger” and “dimensionless.” It is as 
though each constitutes the nameless void for the other; staring at each other, 
they are staring into the void, and the void is staring back. Eventually, this 
tableau is disrupted: “Then it moved. It made no sound. It did not hurry” (76). 
This stilted sentence structure repeats itself: “Then it was gone. It didn’t walk 
into the woods, the undergrowth. It faded, sank back into the wilderness as he 
had watched a fish, a huge old bass, sink and vanish back into the dark 
depths” (76). And the moment is over; Isaac has at last seen Old Ben. 
 The structuring of age returns once more, to set the stage for the final 
encounters. Isaac thinks “It will be next fall. But it was not next fall, nor the 
next nor the next. He was fourteen then” (76). Now a man, he has blossomed 
into full hunting abilities, having fully learned the land. He considers the 
wilderness his education: “If Sam Fathers had been his mentor and the back-
yard rabbits and squirrels at home his kindergarten, then the wilderness the 
old bear ran was his college, the old male bear itself, so long unwifed and 
childless as to have become its own ungendered progenitor, was his alma 
mater” (76). This description of the bear is genealogically interesting: he has 
existed “so long unwifed and childless” that he has become his own 
“ungendered progenitor.” In essence, then, he has given birth to himself; he is 
his own ancestor and descendent. Genealogy has thus been looped: if Old 
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Ben is both father and son, what should be the straight line of inheritance has 
become incestuously circled, doomed to repetition. Here again is the 
degenerating cycle: just like Bon’s new North, doomed to a diminishing 
survival, the bear is trapped in an eternity of solitude.  
 In the climactic final interaction, the balance of power has shifted. The 
bear takes on such human-like equality that “It was not a stalk; it was an 
ambush. He timed the meeting almost as if it were an appointment with a 
human being” (76). They sneak up on him, coming “so close that the bear 
turned without even running, as if in surprised amazement at the shrill and 
frantic uproar of the released fyce, turning at bay against the trunk of a tree, 
on its hind feet; it seemed to the boy that it would never stop rising, taller and 
taller” (76). The bear is cornered against a tree, the victim of an ambush 
instead of the calm observer of past times. And yet it maintains a nobility even 
in defeat, rising upward as though becoming a part of the tree overhanging it. 
Isaac lunges to save his dog, ending up beneath the bear. Looking up, “it 
loomed and towered over him like a cloudburst and colored like a 
thunderclap, quite familiar, peacefully and even lucidly familiar, until he 
remembered: This was the way he had used to dream about it” (76). It is as 
though the bear takes on his full mythic shape only when threatened; he 
towers like a “cloudburst “ and is, synesthetically, “colored like a 
thunderclap.” There is also a return to the idea of remembered knowledge: he 
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has dreamed this truth, this shape of the bear that he has never before seen. 
Moyra Jehlen argues that “paradoxically, given its pre-historic status,” the bear 
“embodies history itself” (5). And further, that “the past which the bear 
embodies is not only terrifying but awesomely majestic and towers over a 
diminished present” (Jehlen 5). This antagonistic portrayal ignores the 
relationship between past and present, Isaac and bear: the past is the present, 
defines the present. In a moment reminiscent of the end of Absalom, Isaac 
cannot shoot: when Sam accuses him “You’ve done seed him twice now with 
a gun in your hands [...] This time you couldn’t have missed him,” Isaac 
responds “Neither could you! [...] You had the gun! Neither did you!” (76). The 
switch from “could” to “did” seems important, as Isaac acknowledges that 
while they both could have shot him, neither did, or actually wanted to.  
 
V 
The story’s final section works to interpret and justify Isaac’s failure, 
ultimately recreating it as an epiphanic triumph. Through the reference to 
Keats’ “Ode on a Grecian Urn,” Faulkner calls on a long lineage of art as 
meaning-maker. Like the bear, the carved urn is both ancient and ageless, 
eternally old yet undying. The urn, like the beautiful boxes in Absalom, 
Absalom!, is a static container of truth, giving the illusion of life like just as a 
short story does. What Isaac’s father seems to be suggesting, shrouded in the 
MacDonnell 87 
Keats rhetoric, is that even if the physical bear is shot, his stature and 
significance will continue through his myth, and its creator, the narrative. It is 
a matter of truth: when Isaac simplistically interprets the poem (“He’s talking 
about a girl”), his father responds “He had to talk about something. [...] He 
was talking about truth. Truth doesn’t change” (77). He therefore connects art, 
truth, and myth: Keats’ art creates a myth that illustrates a deeper truth. 
Faulkner uses another piece of art to create a meta-commentary on his own 
art: the poem within the short story echoes and illuminates; both function 
because they create a myth.  Thus, in the story’s final exchange, Isaac begins to 
see himself taking on the authorial, myth-making role: 
“Courage, and honor, and pride, [...] and pity, and love of justice 
and of liberty. They all touch the heart, and what the heart holds 
to becomes truth, as far as we know truth. Do you see now?” 
Sam, and Old Ben, and Nip, he thought. And himself too. He had 
been all right too. His father had said so. “Yes, sir,” he said. (77) 
 
Isaac parallels his father’s speech, aligning Sam, Old Ben, Nip, and himself 
with the ideals of courage, honor, pride, and pity. He makes his own story into 
an allegory, aligning its actors with Keats’ literary themes, hence actively 
joining the myth-making process. With that final “Yes, sir,” Isaac claims as his 
inheritance the power and responsibility of narration; he is far more prepared 
than Quentin, who cannot make it past “I dont hate it!” to an equivalent 
epiphany. Isaac’s final revelation is the discovery of a type of subjective truth 
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that underlies art and myth, a revelation that permits him to overcome his 
awed fear and fully face the degenerating cycle.  
As he comes of age, Isaac approaches myth with a deep mistrust, 
viewing its timelessness and repetition entirely as a limiting and damaging 
doom. It is the prerogative of the young to mistrust what is old, to attempt to 
shake off the shackles of tradition in favor of the revolutionary. But what 
emerges through the story, both for Isaac and the narrative as a whole, is an 
awareness that, though myth may be both seductive and destructive, it also 
contains a deeper kind of truth. The repetition that once seemed like a burden 
is actually the continuity of truth over generations. By rejecting the 
inheritance of the plantation in the Go Down, Moses version of the story, Isaac 
is participating in the same negotiation process so hyperbolically undertaken 
in Absalom, Absalom!: curating those myths that will survive to the next 
generation, by choosing the nobility and truth of the bear as his true 
inheritance. The urn thus becomes simply another version of Old Ben or 
Bon’s beautiful boxes: a container for myth, the past, and a sense of universal 
truth. “The Bear” draws much from its predecessors: a sense of subjective 
time present in “A Rose for Emily,” the process of inheriting and propagating 
myths in Absalom, Absalom!  But its illustration of myth, which is refracted and 
interpreted through reference to other art forms, is all its own, coming to 
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acknowledge a subjective truth underlying all art, and hence finding a positive 
aspect of the myth-making that so plagued Faulkner’s world. 
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DROPPING THE CURTAIN 
  
Endings to be useful must be inconclusive. 
SAMUEL R. DELANY 
 
These three chapters trace an arc of myth within Faulkner’s canon. 
Faulkner’s works approach myth with a healthy skepticism, only gradually 
coming to find value in a process that is often destructive; his works demand 
of their readers the same perceptive criticism. The non-linear ordering of “A 
Rose for Emily” begins a discussion of the subjectivity of time, while Absalom, 
Absalom! hyperbolically demonstrates a world in flux, lost in the maze of its 
own fragmentary myths, in a constant and chaotic state of mythic negotiation. 
And “The Bear” examines the individual process of coming to terms with 
myth, a complex undertaking that goes beyond simple rejection and 
acceptance, combining a growing understanding of subjective progression and 
the necessity of negotiation toward the acknowledgment of deeply held truths.  
An image from Quentin encapsulates this sense of truth’s continuous 
presence: 
Maybe nothing ever happens once and is finished. Maybe 
happen is never once but like ripples maybe on water after the 
pebble sinks, the ripples moving on, spreading, the pool 
attached by a narrow umbilical water-cord to the next pool 
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which the first pool feeds, has fed, did feed, let this second pool 
contain a different temperature of water, a different molecularity 
of having seen, felt, remembered, reflect in a different tone the 
infinite unchanging sky, it doesn’t matter: that pebble’s watery 
echo whose fall it did not even see moves across its surface too at 
the original ripple-space, to the old ineradicable rhythm. 
(Absalom 261) 
 
The “old ineradicable rhythm,” truth, moves endlessly onward through time 
and space, propelled by the ripples of a pebble “whose fall it did not even 
see,” a beginning no longer remembered yet still eminently present. The past 
reverberates into the future, brought forward again and again through the 
continuously recreated narrative ripples of myth and history. There may not 
be an objective order to the universe, but there is a kind of underlying truth 
that transcends the individual. 
It is all too easy to dismiss myth as belonging to the realm of the 
abstract and theoretical, too removed from reality to constitute anything 
pragmatic. And yet myth makes up the very fabric of society, informing the 
way history is understood and the way people and things are remembered. 
Judith’s dark musings, that “maybe if you go to someone [...] and give them 
something — a scrap of paper [...] at least it would be something just because 
it would have happened, be remembered even if only from passing from one 
hand to another” (Absalom 167), are eerily reminiscent of the notes buried 
underneath the Warsaw Ghetto by its dwindling Jewish population, or of the 
letters to loved ones thrown from trains en route to Auschwitz or Treblinka. 
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These individual narratives have since been woven into the greater narrative 
of the Holocaust, taking part in the universal process of negotiation and 
interpretation that brings cultural memory of the past to future generations. 
The quote at the entrance of the National Holocaust Museum, “You are my 
witnesses” from Isaiah 43:10, is a call to carry the narrative forward, to bear 
witness to the narratives contained within its walls, and in doing so, to repeat 
its myths for the benefit of future generations. Faulkner’s works constitute a 
similar call, demanding readers to bear witness by thinking critically about the 
process of myth-making, not only in the realm of literature but in the world as 
a whole. 
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